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On the Internet, one of the essential characteristics of electronic commerce is the 
integration of large-scale computer networks and business practices.  Commercial servers 
are connected through open and complex communication technologies, and online 
consumers access the services with virtually unpredictable behavior.  Both of them as 
well as the e-Commerce infrastructure are vulnerable to cyber attacks.  Among the 
various network security problems, the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is a 
unique example to illustrate the risk of commercial network applications. Using a 
massive junk traffic, literally anyone on the Internet can launch a DDoS attack to flood 
and shutdown an eCommerce website. 
Cooperative technological solutions for Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) 
attacks are already available, yet organizations in the best position to implement them 
lack incentive to do so, and the victims of DDoS attacks cannot find effective methods to 
motivate the organizations.  Chapter 1 discusses two components of the technological 
solutions to DDoS attacks: cooperative filtering and cooperative traffic smoothing by 
caching, and then analyzes the broken incentive chain in each of these technological 
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solutions.  As a remedy, I propose usage-based pricing and Capacity Provision Networks, 
which enable victims to disseminate enough incentive along attack paths to stimulate 
cooperation against DDoS attacks. 
Chapter 2 addresses possible Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks 
toward the wireless Internet including the Wireless Extended Internet, the Wireless Portal 
Network, and the Wireless Ad Hoc network.  I propose a conceptual model for defending 
against DDoS attacks on the wireless Internet, which incorporates both cooperative 
technological solutions and economic incentive mechanisms built on usage-based fees.  
Cost-effectiveness is also addressed through an illustrative implementation scheme using 
Policy Based Networking (PBN).  By investigating both technological and economic 
difficulties in defense of DDoS attacks which have plagued the wired Internet, our aim 
here is to foster further development of wireless Internet infrastructure as a more secure 
and efficient platform for mobile commerce. 
To avoid centralized resources and performance bottlenecks, online peer-to-peer 
communities and online social network have become increasingly popular.  In particular, 
the recent boost of online peer-to-peer communities has led to exponential growth in 
sharing of user-contributed content which has brought profound changes to business and 
economic practices. Understanding the dynamics and sustainability of such peer-to-peer 
communities has important implications for business managers. In Chapter 3, I explore 
the structure of online sharing communities from a dynamic process perspective.  I build 
an evolutionary game model to capture the dynamics of online peer-to-peer communities.  
Using online music sharing data collected from one of the IRC Channels for over five 
years, I empirically investigate the model which underlies the dynamics of the music 
sharing community.  Our empirical results show strong support for the evolutionary 
process of the community.  I find that the two major parties in the community, namely 
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sharers and downloaders, are influencing each other in their dynamics of evolvement in 
the community.  These dynamics reveal the mechanism through which peer-to-peer 
communities sustain and thrive in a constant changing environment. 
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CHAPTER 1: DEFEATING DDoS ATTACKS BY FIXING THE 
INCENTIVE CHAIN 
Cooperative technological solutions for Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) 
attacks are already available, yet organizations in the best position to implement them 
lack incentive to do so, and the victims of DDoS attacks cannot find effective methods to 
motivate them. In this paper we discuss two components of the technological solutions to 
DDoS attacks: cooperative filtering and cooperative traffic smoothing by caching. We 
then analyze the broken incentive chain in each of these technological solutions. As a 
remedy, we propose usage-based pricing and Capacity Provision Networks, which enable 
victims to disseminate enough incentive along attack paths to stimulate cooperation 
against DDoS attacks. 
“More than a dozen offshore gambling sites serving the US market were hit by the 
so-called Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and extortion demands in 
September. Sites have been asked to pay up to $50,000 (€43,000, £30,000) to ensure they 
are free from attacks for a year. Police are urging victims not to give in to blackmail and 
to report the crime.” – Chris Nuttall, The Financial Times, November 12, 2003, Front 
page – First section. 
INTRODUCTION 
Internet-enabled business, or e-business, has mushroomed into a significant part 
of the US economy, yet further advancement of e-business is plagued by various Quality-
of-Service (QoS) and security problems. One of the worst is the Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attack, which aggregates junk data traffic from up to thousands of 
computers into a formidable volume and floods and effectively blocks a certain victim 
website. DDoS attacks have drawn a lot of media attention since the landmark attacks on 
  2 
a large portfolio of famous e-business websites including Yahoo!, Amazon, CNN, eBay, 
and E*Trade in early 2000 (Kleinbard 2000). Cavusoglu et al. (2002) estimate that the 
firms involved lost more than 2.8% of their market capitalization. Academic discussion 
also quickly followed up with proposals that can be broadly classified into two 
categories: technological solutions (Wang and Reiter 2004, Badishi, Keidar, and Sasson 
2004, Xiang, Zhou, and Chowdhury 2004, Mirkovic et al. 2005 Chapter 7), and economic 
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Figure 1.1. The mechanism of DDoS attacks 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the mechanisms of a DDoS attack. There are two separate 
stages of DDoS attacks: recruiting zombies and flooding the victim (Chang 2002). In the 
recruiting stage (steps 1 and 2), security flaws are used to break into master computers 
and a large set of zombie computers is established. In the flooding stage, a direct attack or 
a reflector attack is launched and synchronized traffic with IP spoofing (Geng and 
Whinston 2000) disables the services of the victim (steps 3 and 3’). 
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It is now well-understood that several cooperative technological solutions 
including cooperative filtering and cooperative traffic smoothing by caching (as we will 
shortly discuss) will be quite effective against DDoS attacks if they are implemented. 
Nevertheless, it turns out to be a big “if”: while some of those cooperative technological 
solutions were proposed as early as in 2000 (e.g. RFC 2827 - ubiquitous ingress 
filtering), they are clearly not effectively deployed since DDoS attacks still threaten the 
Internet (Naraine 2002), sometimes in a more hazardous way: in one recent incidence, a 
Russian mafia launched DDoS attacks and brought down more than a dozen offshore 
gambling sites serving the US market, such as www.VIPSports.com and 
www.Betgameday.com (The Financial Times, November 12, 2003). The gangs 
blackmailed the victims and demanded $50,000 for one-year protection.  
On the surface, this seems to be an irony: The consensus is that defeating DDoS 
attacks will be beneficial to e-business giving the huge lost these attacks cost; however, 
organizations are still reluctant to establish the defense. For example, despite some 
occasional practices, cooperative filtering is still not widely used on the Internet. 
In this paper we argue that, although there is room for more improvements in 
technological solutions, the priority should be placed on economic solutions given the 
extremely unbalanced development in these two directions: until now a vast amount of 
research has been done on technological solutions while only a handful exist on 
economic parts. In fact, the irony is just the result of the continuing ignorance of 
incentive issues involved in dealing with DDoS attacks, and the intuition behind this 
irony is actually quite straightforward: the parties that suffer the most are not in the best 
position to defend, while the parties in the best position do not suffer enough to defend. 
Successful delivery of digital contents requires the collaboration of multiple parties, such 
as Internet Content Providers (ICP), Backbone ISPs, regional ISPs, and end users. Each 
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of them makes independent decisions to invest and contribute to the delivery process. The 
value of final products depends on the effort of each party. An incentive chain, which is 
the set of value and monetary transactions along digital delivery channels, acts as a glue 
to stick various parties together in collaboration. In case of DDoS attacks the incentive 
chain is often broken: defensive actions by ISPs benefit ICPs and end users the most, yets 
ISPs are rarely compensated for – and thus often under-motivated to take – these actions.   
How to fix the broken incentive chain? Or phrased differently: how to transfer 
incentives from the parties that suffer the most to the parties that are in the best position 
to defend? We propose an integrated framework that has two pillars: a usage-based traffic 
pricing structure that stimulates cooperative filtering (Geng and Whinston 2000), and a 
market for demand-side cache trading called Capacity Provision Networks (CPN) that 
gives cache owners incentives to perform cooperated traffic smoothing (Geng et al. 2003, 
2005).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the structure of 
digital supply chains and explains what effective technological solutions are readily 
available against DDoS attacks. Section 3 analyzes the incentive chain on the Internet, 
and shows why it is broken under DDoS attacks, and thus why the technological 
solutions fail to materialize. Section 4 illustrates the remedies and associated costs.  In 
Section 5, we discuss some key players and technologies – especially overlay networks 
and Internet mapping – that have significant impacts on potential remedies. Section 6 
concludes this paper. 
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THE DIGITAL SUPPLY CHAIN AND COOPERATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL 
SOLUTIONS TO DDOS ATTACKS 













Figure 1.2. The digital supply chain 
To understand how the technological solutions against DDoS attacks work, we 
need to first understand how the Internet-based digital supply chain works. Figure 1.2 
gives a simple illustration of the Internet structure, which consists of the following 
components (data from navigators.com): 
1. The Internet core, which consists of dozens of interconnected backbone ISPs who collectively 
maintain the backbone of the Internet.  
2. The Internet cloud except the core, which consists of less than 10,000 regional ISPs that connect 
to the core through one or several backbone ISPs and serve different geographical regions. 
3. The edge of the Internet, which consists of around 100,000 networks that are locally 
administrated. 
4. Millions of online computers including content servers and clients. 
Besides transmitting data packets, regional ISPs and local networks often provide 
caching, which is the temporary storage of data for quick retrieval by local users.  
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In this structure, content requests and delivery are fulfilled in a variety of ways 
including: 
1. Direct communication between clients and content servers, as the route from client A to server B 
in Figure 1.2. 
2. Cache-intermediated communication where a cache server first stores a copy of server’s content, 
which is then accessed by adjacent clients, as the route from client A to cache C in Figure 1.2.  
With respect to a commercial Internet content provider (ICP), not all the content 
requests are equally valuable: if the ICP is an online retailer, the requests that lead to 
purchases are most valuable. Nevertheless, the current Internet infrastructure does not 
distinguish between requests. When congestion happens, some requests have to be 
dropped, and the ones dropped could be valuable. In the scenario of DDoS attacks, as a 
content server is jammed by junk requests, almost all valuable requests from legitimate 
clients are dropped, which leads to a significant financial loss and reputation damage for 
the ICP. 
Cooperative Filtering 
When it comes to defending against DDoS attacks, there are several common 
misunderstandings. One common misunderstanding is that “we still do not have any 
effective technological solution against DDoS attacks.” We do. The first one is 
cooperative filtering, where the ISPs along attack paths cooperatively filter out attack 
traffic (Geng and Whinston 2000). The second one is cooperative caching, where instead 
of filtering out attack traffic, ISPs try to divert it to multiple caches such that each cache 
(and the ICP) only bears a manageable fraction of the whole traffic (Naraine 2002). The 
details of both are explained shortly. Another common misunderstanding is that “the 
victim of a DDoS attack can defend itself by implementing some security and/or traffic 
control systems in its own boundary.” The victim cannot do it efficiently. Although 
intrusion detection systems on the victim side can prevent attack traffic from reaching 
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content servers, DDoS attacks can simply flood the entrance (i.e. the router) to its 
network, rendering all local defenses irrelevant. One direct implication is that 















Figure 1.3. The process of cooperative filtering 
Cooperative filtering is the first cooperative technological solution. Cooperative 
filtering works in three steps: alarming, tracing, and filtering (illustrated in Figure 1.3). 
By analyzing the pattern of network traffic, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) identify 
suspicious traffic and send out alarms. Following the alarms, a tracing mechanism kicks 
in to track back each attack path as far as possible. Finally, a series of filters along every 
attack path are configured to filter out attack traffic. In the best scenario, a tracing 
mechanism may find the computers (zombies) that are initiating attack traffic, and may 
inform the responsible ISPs to take them offline. 
One simple approach of cooperative filtering is to ban IP-spoofing at the edge of 
the Internet. Attack traffic consists of a large amount of IP packets, where each packet 
contains its source-address. If source addresses are correct, the tracing mechanism will be 
very simple: just informing the ISP serving that IP address to take that computer offline. 
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Nevertheless, IP-spoofing is the technology which modifies the source-address and 
makes it useless. Note that IP-spoofing can be detected by the immediate ISPs of 
attacking computers: an ISP can simply compare the source-address with the route the 
packet comes from – if they are not consistent, IP-spoofing is detected. Therefore, if IP-
spoofing is banned everywhere at the edge of the Internet, tracing DDoS attack sources 
will be quite straightforward. 
Cooperative Caching 
Instead of filtering out attack traffic, DDoS attacks can also be defeated by 
diverting and evenly distributing attack traffic from a victim into a large number of cache 
servers such that each stream of diverted traffic is not significant enough in volume to 
create any congestion (Geng et al. 2003), as shown in Figure 1.5. 
Cooperative caching is an effective solution to DDoS attacks when cooperative 
filtering is costly to implement, or when attack traffic is well concealed in legitimate data 
requests such that pattern recognition is technically difficult. Cooperative caching and 
filtering can also be jointly deployed so that attack traffic is both reduced and diverted, 
resulting in a more effective defense. 
One important technological issue using cooperative caching to defeat DDoS 
attacks is the fact that only relatively static content can be cached. If a DDoS attack 
targets dynamic content or protocols (such as ICMP ECHO, SYN floods, BGP floods), 
traditional caching solutions cannot divert it. This issue is now partially addressed in two 
ways. First, standards like Edge Side Include (ESI, see www.esi.org) enable caching of 
dynamic content. Second, more ISPs start screening and restricting control packets. For 
example, the attacks using ping commands are no longer effective when ICMP traffic is 
restricted. 
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THE BROKEN INCENTIVE CHAIN 
Despite the fact that cooperative filtering and cooperative caching are two 
effective technological solutions against DDoS attacks, to date they have been rarely 
deployed on the Internet. The reason becomes quite straightforward once we look at the 
digital supply chain from another perspective: that of the incentive chain. 
There are two major sources driving the flow of digital content on the commercial 
Internet: end users’ demand to consume digital content and ICPs’ demand to publish 
digital content. As shown in Figure 1.4, while both end users and ICPs only pay directly 
to their ISPs for Internet connections, those regional ISPs in turn pay larger regional ISPs 
and backbone ISPs for the connectivity to the core of the Internet. We call this series of 
payments the “incentive chain,” which acts as glue to link all parties together in the end-
to-end transmission of digital content. 
 
 












Figure 1.4. The incentive chain 
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Lack of Incremental Payment Structure and the Failure of Cooperative Filtering 
Today the dominant payment method on the Internet is subscription, where an end 
user/regional ISP pays a fixed monthly fee to a regional ISP/backbone ISP for Internet 
connections. Within a certain range of traffic volumes that can be accommodated by 
specific Internet connections, actual usage is irrelevant to monthly payments. As a result, 
the traffic pattern of individual users is often highly volatile. To avoid congestion and 
guarantee a certain level of quality of service, ISPs tend to be conservative in planning 
and acquire extra bandwidth.  
One important implication of this conservative practice in uplink planning is that 
most of the time ISPs have abundant residue bandwidth unused that they already paid for 
to the upper-level ISPs. ISPs are willing to provide such an unused resource for better 
consumer retention, and on the surface it appears to not hurt anybody else. However, it 
actually leads to devastating consequences on cooperative filtering against DDoS attacks 
once we look at the question: what are the costs and benefits for an ISP to engage in 
cooperative filtering? While the cost side includes the administrative work in setting up 
and maintaining filters, and the reduction of transmission performance due to filtering 
overhead; the benefit side often includes little to nothing as long as DDoS attacks only 
consume some of the residue bandwidth, which is unused anyway. 
As an example, recall the infamous DDoS attacks in early 2000 that disabled 
websites like Yahoo!. Giving the distributed nature of DDoS attacks, attack traffic from 
each zombie computer was not huge enough to cause any local congestion and mostly 
even not noticed by its local ISP. In other words, defending against those DDoS attacks 
brings little benefit, or none at all, to those local ISPs. Then what are the incentives for 
those local ISPs to cooperate with Yahoo! by setting up costly filters? 
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Although subscription is the usual payment method for Internet access, in practice 
the victims of DDoS attacks may have more flexibility in interacting with their direct 
ISPs. In the Yahoo! case, given the importance of Yahoo! as a large corporate client, its 
ISP actually closely cooperated with it to filter out attack traffic. However, such 
flexibility rapidly diminishes alone the incentive chain – it took Yahoo! days just to 
persuade ISPs along attack paths to help trace back to zombie computers.  
The inability of victims in DDoS attacks to motivate ISPs who are in the best 
position to filter attack traffic is the direct result of the lack of incremental payment 
structures on the Internet. By selling and buying Internet access on a subscription basis, 
ISPs have little incentive to control traffic volumes as long as it does not create 
congestion in their own neighborhoods, simply because the marginal cost for transmitting 
additional data packets is zero. Additional bandwidth may be used to initiate DDoS 
attacks and harm ICPs far away. However, this does not provide any incentive for local 
ISPs to take any action. Clearly, when it comes to a DDoS attack, the incentive chain is 
broken.  
 
Caches on the Edge of the Internet: Inaccessible Treasures 
The optimization of an incentive chain is all about the tradeoffs between the costs 
and benefits of various possible incentive schemes. As we noted before, cooperative 
filtering is actually costly to ISPs because of administrative costs and performance 
reduction. Alternatively, if DDoS attack traffic can be diverted to a lot of cache servers 
through cooperative caching, it can be an effective solution as it prevents the 
accumulation of traffic from happening. Thinking of DDoS attacks as floods in the 
Mississippi River, then the cache servers distributed over the Internet are like the 
countless lakes along the Mississippi that absorb the floods. Since cache servers already 
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exist, as long as cooperative caching only uses redundant cache capacity, it incurs little 
cost to any party involved, and thus is more cost efficient than cooperative filtering. 
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 1.4, ISPs’ caches only serve their local users 
who pay for connections. Congestion at the ICP’s website does not provide any payment 
for cache servers on the demand side to engage in cooperative caching. Therefore, the 
resource is inactive in the theme of defending DDoS attacks, and again the incentive 
chain is broken.  
Note that the reasons for broken incentive chains are different in cooperative 
filtering and in cooperative caching: in the former, the payment structure exists – it just 
does not offer proper incentives for cooperation; in the latter, there is simply no payment 
structure. The reason that there is no payment structure from ICPs to regional ISPs who 
own demand-side caches is straightforward: an ICP is never sure where DDoS attacks 
will come from, and which cache servers are in the best positions to help. Signing 
payment contracts with each of tens of thousands of regional ISPs to have a full-fledge 
defense against possible DDoS attacks is impractical. 
FIXING THE INCENTIVE CHAIN 
Fixing the incentive chain requires two types of effort. First, in the scenarios 
where payment structures already exist but do not offer the right incentive, the incentive 
chain needs to be reengineered accordingly. For instance, a usage-based, instead of a 
subscription-based, pricing structure provides the right incentive for cooperative filtering. 
Second, if payment structures do not exist at all, new market mechanisms need to be 
established. In the context of cooperative caching, we apply the Capacity Provision 
Network (CPN) market mechanism to enable regional ISPs to collectively offer caching 
services to ICPs. As Internet mapping is indispensable for cooperative filtering and 
caching, we also discuss the proper incentive structures for Internet mapping. 
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Usage-Based Pricing 
Usage-based pricing ties payments to actual traffic volumes, thus is an 
incremental payment structure. One common form of usage-based pricing is IP-packet 
based pricing, where the cost for transmitting one IP packet is fixed. It is used, for 
example, by NTT DoCoMo in pricing i-mode services in Japan. Another form of usage-
based pricing that is heavily studied in academia is congestion-based pricing, also called 
dynamic pricing, where the cost for transmitting packets is dynamically adjusted based 
on network congestion (Gupta, Stahl, and Whinston 1999). 
The central requirement of usage-based pricing is that the cost of transmitting the 
attack traffic generated by zombie computers has to be large enough for related ISPs even 
when it does not lead to any congestion, thus they have enough incentive to set up filters. 
As long as this requirement is fulfilled, the specific structure of usage-based pricing is not 
important in defending against DDoS attacks.  
To clarify this statement, we need to point out two aspects of usage-based pricing 
for defending against DDoS attacks. First, usage-based pricing need not be complex for 
end users or ISPs to figure out. Take the pricing practice of major US wireless providers 
as an example: they usually offer a ladder of choices where a customer pays a fixed 
amount for the minutes within a certain range, and pay per minute fee for any minutes 
beyond that range. Such a pricing structure offers customers the peace of mind when they 
are within the range, while also offers them the flexibility to talk more if they want to. 
This is clearly an example of non-linear usage-based pricing that is quite simple for 
consumers to calculate their cost. If such a laddered pricing structure is adopted in 
Internet pricing (just as an example), as long as a DDoS attack leads ISPs to exceed their 
traffic limits or forces them to pick a higher ladder, it provides ISPs an incentive to filter. 
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Second, usage-based pricing does not necessarily require the overhead of traffic 
metering. Due to the nature of the Internet, packet counting is costly and infeasible. 
Furthermore, since the packets have no explicit value, it is meaningless to charge based 
on traffic. The “usage” indicates the acquisition of verifiable resources and services, such 
as bandwidth, cache, and excess traffic (it is a common practice for ISPs). For example, if 
ISPs can buy extra bandwidth from upper-level ISPs in real time, and DDoS attacks lead 
them to buy more to mitigate congestion, then these ISPs will have an incentive to filter. 
Note that in this example, traffic metering is not necessary – it only requires ISPs to be 
able to dynamically acquire capacity from upper-level ISPs according to network 
conditions. 
Capacity Provision Network 
As we mentioned earlier, it is difficult for ICPs to get help from regional ISPs on 
cooperative caching because signing bilateral contracts with each of them to provide 
incentives is too costly to be practical. What if all the regional ISPs have their cache 
capacity organized by an intermediary who in turn deals with ICPs? In this scenario, ICPs 
only need to deal with and pay a single entity – the intermediary, and the intermediary 
specializes in dividing the payment and compensating the participating ISPs who provide 
cache capacity.  
Such an intermediary is yet to emerge. In several recent research papers, Geng et 
al. proposed the concept of a Capacity Provision Network (CPN), which is a network of 
cache servers owned, operated and coordinated through capacity trading by different ISPs 
(Geng et al. 2003, 2005). A CPN is initially proposed for demand-side cache trading, the 
usefulness of which is supported by the fact that there exist positive network externalities 
across individual ISPs who provide caching services to their respective local users: when 
some ISPs are experiencing high demand for caching, other ISPs’ cache capacity may be 
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idling. Therefore, by sharing the idling cache capacity with busy ISPs total welfare 
increases.  
Cache trading is operated in a CPN market, which is organized by a market 
owner. We propose that the owner of the CPN market fits well in the intermediary’s role 
as we described it above: the owner specializes in dealing with large numbers of ISPs 
who own cache servers, and the owner is a single entity that can deal with outside 
















Figure 1.5. Capacity Provision Networks 
Figure 1.5 illustrates an incentive chain for a CPN owner intermediated 
cooperative caching. An ICP initiates the incentive chain by contracting with and paying 
the CPN owner for cooperative caching against any possible DDoS attacks. When a 
DDoS attack happens, the CPN owner decides which cache server is in the best position 
to dilute the traffic and then accordingly pays relevant ISPs to start cooperative caching, 
which completes the incentive chain. Of course, how much the ICP pays the CPN owner 
depends in turn on how much the owner pays ISPs. 
Note that besides the CPN solution where an intermediary coordinates an army of 
independent ISPs, a Content Distribution Network (CDN) company can also execute 
cooperative caching. For example, Akamai provides traffic smoothing for ICPs through 
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its global network. The operator of a CDN replicates digital content at the edge of 
networks and redirects requests based on complicated algorithms (Wang, Pai and 
Peterson 2002). There are three advantages a CPN has over a CDN. First, the collective 
cache capacity of all regional ISPs is much larger than the capacity of a single CDN 
company, and is far more distributed. Therefore, a CPN can deliver much better 
performance with cooperative caching. Second, a CPN needs little initial investment, as it 
is based on existing caching capacities of regional ISPs, while a CDN requires a 
considerable initial investment on hardware – there is already abundant cache capacity on 
the Internet, why build new ones? Finally, the cache capacity traded in a CPN is 
dedicated to buyers.  An ICP can serve local consumers at given time by acquiring 
capacity and caching specific content. However, in a CDN, since the operator manages 
the allocation of content and the methods of request redirection, the QoS for each ICP is 
uncertain. It leads to a major drawback in pricing CDN services: ICPs have to pay in 
advance for unpredictable evens and service level agreements (SLAs) are difficult to 
design and verify.   
A Simple Model of Cache Trading 
To demonstrate the use of CPNs and the differences between CPNs and CDNs, 
we show an application of CPNs in the scenario of DDoS attacks. Without sophisticated 
intrusion detection and traffic monitoring, a simple fixed fee for cache capacity can divert 
traffic away from the server side. As shown in Figure 1.5, when suffering a massive 
volume of traffic, ICP A can always discover frequently requested content and the major 
sources of traffic, which could be either legitimate requests or an attack flood. Instead of 
separating them, ICP A can establish a mirror of popular targets in ISP networks, which 
directly control the sources of traffic.   
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A trading hub of the CPN provides a mechanism to use ISP side cache capacity in 
real-time (Geng et al 2003). A cache server (in cases of ISPs B & C) or remote cache 
capacity provided by peered ISPs (in ISP D’s case) improves the QoS of legal users and 
blocks a large amount of malicious traffic. Since this solution does not change ISP side 
redirectors, such as cache redirectors, local filters, and DNS servers, ISPs have no extra 
investment. A simple static payment for capacity will create incentives for ISPs to share 
local resources. 
In this scenario, an ICP pays for what it uses: buying and utilizing cache servers 
in a certain time period for specified users. As long as gains in terms of increased QoS or 
decreased damage from DDoS attacks exceed the costs of cache capacities, ICPs will 
utilize a desirable amount of cache. A CDN, in contrast, consists of a global cache 
infrastructure, a set of distributed redirectors, a network operating center, and third-party 
audits. It is in the owner’s best interest to oversell the capacity and maximize profits. 
From one ICP’s point of view, although Service level agreements (SLAs) are specified in 
terms of long-term contracts, the operation of CDNs is not directly committed to its 
payoffs since the redirectors (i.e. the allocation of capacity) are designed to optimize 
overall performance of the whole CDN. There are potential conflicts among users of a 
CDN. Therefore, the best strategy for each individual ICP is often to over-utilize the 
caches, and the incentive chain is still broken in the CDN environment. 
This example of CPNs illustrates that cache trading shifts incentive for ICPs to 
ISPs. A dynamic pricing mechanism based on network conditions and demand can 
potentially lead to more efficient allocation of cache capacities. However, the CPN itself 
does not provide information for resource discovery and evaluation. In section 5, we will 
discuss network mapping, which is a service that facilitates dynamic resource allocation. 
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Cost Assessment 
A solution to DDoS attacks would have little practical value if the costs involved 
in implementation outrun the benefits. The costs include one-time investment (acquiring 
additional devices and redundant resources), operation costs (filtering, monitoring, 
collecting and exchanging information, etc.), and administrative costs (configuring, 
billing, auditing, and disputing). 
Under the current Internet architecture, the cost of CDNs and server-side 
detecting/filtering is very high because the huge investments in monitoring infrastructures 
and redundant resources drive prices up. For example, Akamai invested millions of 
dollars in building their caching network, measuring networks, and operating center, 
which only support a small number of customers. For server-side filtering, some products 
provide moderate control to enhance performance without a significant measurement 
network. Since it is difficult to collect information about traffic (such as usage patterns 
and the fingerprints of attacks) and perform filtering at edge points, the solutions require 
very complicated algorithms and processing capacity, which result in expansive hardwire 
implementations. For example, with prices of intelligent routing solutions as high as 
$250,000, customers can choose the quality and cost of services from multiple ISPs. For 
the DDoS attack-detection and mitigation, the price is as high as $32,000 for filter/IDS 
based products (According to the review of Network World, Sep 2, 2002).  
A large up-front cost to customers limits the potential customer base. Since DDoS 
attacks are rare events for a specific firm, considering a six- to nine-month return on 
investment (ROI), the value of these solutions is very small. The overhead of extra layer 
and filtering may degenerate the performance of networks and yield a negative ROI. 
Moreover, a management tool that combines traffic monitoring and filtering could cost 
more intensive networking jobs. To drill down and fine-tune a network, more labor hours 
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are required in administration and operation tasks, such as the analyses of raw data and 
the configuration of routing or filtering.  
Compared to CDNs and the server-side solutions, direct investment in bandwidth 
and caching is more cost-effective. The report by TeleGeography indicates that costs of 
IP transit connections in Europe and the U.S. have fallen continually over the past three 
years. For instance, the price of STM-1 (155 Mbit/s) links is getting as low as $50 per 
Mbit/s (based on a report from Band-X Ltd., a bandwidth exchange). Moreover, ISP 
peering can largely reduce the cost of bandwidth. For example, in a promotion, the 
Equinix San Jose Internet Business Exchange (IBX) offers a DS3 (45Mbps) transport 
circuit for $1000/month (Norton 2002).  
In current practices in the ISP industry, since almost all pricing schemes in 
bandwidth and caching are flat-fee based (even in the transit-based traffic exchange, a 
monthly fee is charged based upon a peak rate traffic sample), firms choose to acquire 
extra capacities instead of investing in pro-active solutions for potential DDoS attacks. 
By utilizing the existing resources in networks, cooperative solutions, such as CPNs, 
reduce the requirements of traffic measuring and analyzing, as well as corresponding 
administrative costs.   
OTHER TECHNOLOGIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE REMEDIES 
When it comes to the implementation of potential remedies, some emerging 
technologies come to our attention since they have similar characteristics of usage-based 
pricing and CPN, and significantly affect the effectiveness of these remedies. In this 
section we focus on two technologies, overlay networks and Internet mapping, and give a 
brief review of others. 
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Overlay Networks 
Internet users are often charged not only by their ISPs. For example, a music fan 
may need to pay fees to entertainment websites or commercial Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
networks for access to online albums. In cases where users/regional ISPs pay multiple 
fees in which the fee charged by their direct regional/backbone ISPs is only a small 
portion of the total payment, an effective incentive structure against DDoS attacks 
requires that the total fee has to be incremental as we discussed before.  
Beside the payment to the directly connected ISP, each of the fees an Internet user 
pays allows her to utilize a specific Internet service. Often, a specific Internet service can 
be viewed as an application-level network that is based on the general infrastructure of 
the Internet, referred to as an overlay network. In an example of music sharing, an 
overlay network can be a content intermediary provided by an entertainment website, or 
simply a distributed P2P network. Overlay networks for various purposes have been 
heavily studied in recent years by computer scientists (see, for example, SkipNet Harvey 
et al. 2003), and are arguably viewed as the future organizational form of a scalable 
Internet computing environment. Ideally, multiple overlay networks are expected to share 
the common Internet infrastructure for their computing and communication needs, while 
at the same time maintain their relative independence in performing their respective 
tasks. 
In the scenario of overlay networks, the total payment of an Internet user often 
consists of two parts: one part is the payment to the direct ISP for Internet access – in 
other words, payment for communication infrastructures; the other consists of a 
collection of payments, each of which goes to a specific overlay network. 
Fee structures can vary a great deal across different overlay networks. While 
accessing up-to-date stock quotes in a financial network is often expensive, sharing 
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family pictures and videos in peer-to-peer networks can be cheap or even costless. Not 
surprisingly, according to the usual economic principles of supply-demand and 
competition, the value of services and the switching cost for users to choose other similar 
alternatives determine the fee structure of an overlay network. 
Nevertheless, the discrepancy in fee structures among various overlay networks, 
and the independent nature of all overlay networks, may thwart the effective defense 
against DDoS attacks if the total fee a user/regional ISP pays lacks incremental merits. 
For example, even if all other overlay networks as well as ISPs charge usage-based fees, 
a single overlay network (think of Napster or Gnutella) that does not implement an 
incremental fee structure will significantly flatten the total payment all users paid, which 
in turn weakens the incentive chain against DDoS attacks.  
The situation is further worsened by the possibility of free riding. Recall all 
overlay networks share the same Internet infrastructure. Users’ strong demand for some 
highly valuable overlay networks (e.g. financial overlay networks) may provide strong 
incentive for ISPs to heavily invest in bandwidth. Knowing this, other overlay networks 
may take advantage of the large bandwidth for other low-valuation but high traffic 
purposes. One extreme example is frequent network congestion in university networks 
caused by intensive music sharing activities. 
The key to solving the challenge that overlay networks pose for implementing a 
usage-based fee is incentive alignment among various overlay networks: in our view, 
while maintaining functional independence, the cost structure of each overlay network 
should be tied to the activities of other overlay networks since the increasing traffic in 
one network negatively affects all others as they all share the common Internet 
infrastructure. Although specific measures for incentive alignment depend on specific 
overlay networks, which remain to be studied, the general principles can be found in 
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existing economic literature on the trading of pollution rights (Ledyard and Szakaly-
Moore 1994). Intuitively, users in an overlay network should pay not only the direct costs 
of using that overlay network, but also the damage to other overlay networks. Another 
useful economic tool is the comparative statics (Currier 2000), which helps to adjust 
incentives on a micro-level in complex situations. 
Internet Mapping for Optimal Supply Chain Selection 
Another related technology is Internet mapping. Note that for any content request, 
the choice of suppliers may not be unique: a client can request a certain chunk of content 
from several candidate content servers; similarly, an ICP can have its content cached at 
selected cache servers out of a large pool of candidates. Such a selection problem can be 
solved if the client or the ICP in question has a complete view of Internet topology, and 
has up-to-date information on related delay information. Nevertheless, maintaining a 
complete map of Internet topology and corresponding information requires a considerable 
amount of storage and processing capability from each computer.  
An alternative approach to optimizing supply chain selection is Internet mapping, 
where the Internet is hypothesized to be a multi-dimensional Euclidean space in which all 
network devices reside (Ng and Zhang 2002). Giving a set of representative landmark 
nodes, all other devices on the Internet measure the delay from them to the landmark 
nodes, and accordingly calculate their locations in the Euclidean space. Based on their 
locations, any two devices on the Internet can approximately estimate the delay between 
them by simply calculating the distance of the two positions.  
Based on Internet mapping, it is straightforward to see that effective traffic 
filtering and content caching depend on accurate mapping information. Empirical studies 
show that Internet mapping is able to produce good approximations to the actual delay 
between any two devices on the Internet (Ng and Zhang 2002), if all devices truthfully 
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report their locations and delay information. However, this is another big “if”, as Internet 
mapping could go wrong even if we have good algorithms for it.  
In Internet mapping, a network node calculates its position based on the positions 
of several reference nodes and the delay to each of them. The assumption in this process 
is that all reference nodes will truthfully report their positions. However, this is not 
always true as reporting the truth may not be in the best interest of one or more reference 
nodes. As an example, consider a cache server that resides at a high-bandwidth 
neighborhood so when its neighbor ISPs are in high demand, it is often in the best 
position to help. Knowing this, the cache server will expect a large amount of requests 
from its neighbors if they are affected by DDoS attacks. If the ISP owning the cache 
server is not compensated enough for helping cooperative caching, or if the ISP simply 
does not want to participate in cooperative caching, it can avoid the cooperation by 
cheating and responding with an erroneous and remote position to all requests. In this 
way, it avoids heavy traffic at the local site but also reduces the effectiveness of 
cooperative caching. 
The incentive issue in Internet mapping is difficult to solve since a successful 
solution needs to give all participating reference nodes enough incentive to truthfully 
report. When deciding whether to report its true location or not, a network node needs to 
consider all activities it is currently participating in, which could be highly dynamic. A 
useful reference on incentive alignment among large numbers of network nodes is Stahl 
and Whinston (1994). In the scheme of defending DDoS attacks, network mapping is one 
of essential overlay technologies, which provides applications with information and extra 
control beyond low-level networks. Therefore, end users, such as ICPs, can implement 
flexible defending solutions with the principle of end-to-end arguments (Saltzer, Reed, 
and Clark 1984). 
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Key Players in Reconstruction of the Internet Infrastructure 
DDoS attacks are an extreme case of Quality of Service (QoS) problems on the 
Internet. Because of the growing concern about the reliability of the Internet, many 
companies have addressed QoS issues from various aspects. Some of them have 
embedded resource-trading markets and have implemented usage-based fee structures. 
The following table summarizes the major players and commercial technologies 
employed in the reconstruction of the Internet infrastructure. 
 
Category Technologies Leader companies 
ISPs ISP peering, caching, edge control Cable & Wireless, GTE, 
PSInet, Sprint, Uunet, 
AT&T, Qwest ; Cox, etc. 
Border Route 
Services 
Intelligent routing, Multi-homing, 
Traffic Classification 




Content Delivery Content Distribution Network (CDN), 
Global Load Balancing (GLB) 
Akamai, Speedera; Cable 
& Wireless, NTT; Coyote 




Active Probing, Performance 
Monitoring, Traffic Engineering 
Keynote, F5 Networks, 
Mercury Interactive Corp, 
Gomez. 
Table 1.1. Major players in reconstruction of the Internet infrastructure 
Given the ability to managing Internet traffic directly, ISPs have the biggest 
impact on the structure of the Internet. ISP peering and caching are widely used to 
improve quality of service. However, peering and caching have a limited influence on 
Internet architecture since only the owners of resources can benefit from these 
technologies. In other words, the usage of peer connections and cache capacity are not 
transferable. Therefore applications cannot get direct support from ISP peering and 
caching. As a result, Internet topology becomes extremely complicated and a large 
amount of resources are wasted. 
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To solve this problem, several companies provide additional resources directly to 
content and service providers. Extra resources, such as alternative Internet connections 
and storage, can be acquired by particular applications and increase the reliability of the 
services. Intelligent routing is an edge point solution that directs outbound traffic among 
multiple Internet access connections applies according to the characteristics of differnet 
communication channels. After acquiring Netvmg and Sockeye, Internap has become the 
leader in providing intelligent routing solutions. By building an overlay network that 
continually analyzes the traffic situation on major Internet backbones, Internap selects the 
path of least resistance for its clients to deliver content faster and more reliably. When 
congestion occurs at one of the connections, a multi-homing ICP can still publish its 
content through other connections. However, intelligent routing only partially mitigates 
DDoS attacks. Since only outbound traffic is under control, a DDoS attack will block all 
incoming requests for services from one or more connections and therefore shutdown the 
services in a particular region. 
In content delivery solutions, the Content Distribution Network (CDN) and 
Global Load Balancing (GLB) impose controls on inbound traffic. Redirectors (such as 
dynamic DNS servers) distribute incoming requests among a set of cache servers or hosts 
using algorithms with the perception of network delay and the performance of servers.  
It is clear that each player has strengths and weaknesses. Cross-sector 
collaborations are forming among the players: ISPs start to adopt tiered-pricing systems 
based on traffic classification; companies in different industries share resources to reduce 
sunk-costs; the intelligent routing industry has been consolidated to provide cost-effective 
infrastructures. As an overlay service, a network monitoring service is a perfect glue to 
facilitate the collaborations in defending against DDoS attacks. 
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Using software agents deployed over the Internet, network monitoring services 
produce information on Internet topology, traffic reports and tracemaps, and help IT 
personnel quantify bandwidth utilization and delay. This will help them assess the 
possibilities of overload and the need (or lack of need) to purchase additional capacity. 
For example, as a pioneer of network mapping, Matrix NetSystems (acquired by Keynote 
Systems in 2003) has built a global monitoring infrastructure with the help of ISPs to 
analyze Internet performance.  Through the collaboration with a large set of backbone 
ISPs (e.g. PSInet) and hosting companies (e.g. Internap), Matrix NetSystems deployed 
measurement computers, called “beacons”, in different geographical locations 
worldwide. The beacons use active probing technologies, such ICMP pings, to measure 
Internet IP transit delay and costumer-specified parameters. With the “beacon network”, 
Matrix NetSystems could measure specified routes precisely and became one of the three 
major venders of DDoS alert services for the Department of Homeland Security. 
As a strategic solution, organizations can use this diagnostic information to 
determine which physical link (ISPs, nodes, etc.) in the Internet infrastructure is 
responsible for performance degradation and, in turn, remove the bottlenecks. 
Furthermore, real-time traffic information can be used in tactic solutions, such as 
directing traffic in intelligent routing and trading bandwidth and cache capacities. 
Network mapping services facilitate information collection and payment exchange to 
achieve an integrated defense scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
The major message we want to convey in this paper is that, in dealing with DDoS 
attacks, industry and academia have long ignored the incentive aspect of the problem, 
which turns out to be the key in defeating DDoS attacks. We then argue that two 
incentive mechanisms, the usage-based pricing and CPN, can effectively support 
  27
effective technological solutions, such as cooperative filtering and cooperative caching. 
In practice, we expect to see a combination of both incentive mechanisms and the two 
technological solutions: blocking a flood is quite effective, but sometimes diluting and 
thus smoothing the flood may be more cost-effective.  
As an important note to practitioners, the incentive mechanisms and technological 
solutions in this paper apply to but are not exclusive to DDoS attacks. Unless a DDoS 
attack is highly likely to happen and the consequence is significant, no business will 
spend a huge amount on new incentive mechanisms or technological solutions solely for 
DDoS attacks. Rather, new solutions must address a much broader range of QoS 
problems, in which the DDoS attack is just one extreme case that one needs to be aware 
of. As an example, ISPs may initiate usage-based pricing mainly for better QoS in 
transmitting legitimate but prioritized traffic – as long as it has the incremental payment 
characteristic we discussed in this paper, it also helps against DDoS attacks. 
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CHAPTER 2: Defending Wireless Infrastructure Against the Challenge 
of DDoS Attacks 
This paper addresses possible Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks 
toward the wireless Internet including the Wireless Extended Internet, the Wireless Portal 
Network, and the Wireless Ad Hoc network. We propose a conceptual model for 
defending against DDoS attacks on the wireless Internet, which incorporates both 
cooperative technological solutions and economic incentive mechanisms built on usage-
based fees. Cost-effectiveness is also addressed through an illustrative implementation 
scheme using Policy Based Networking (PBN). By investigating both technological and 
economic difficulties in defense of DDoS attacks which have plagued the wired Internet, 
our aim here is to foster further development of wireless Internet infrastructure as a more 
secure and efficient platform for mobile commerce. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The wireless Internet has become an exciting realm for m-commerce at an 
amazing speed. The estimated number of wireless subscribers was 109 million in 
December 2000 in the US alone, according to a semi-annual wireless industry survey 
conducted by Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA 2000). It 
represented an increase of 27.2% from a year earlier, adding nearly 23.43 million new 
users. According to a new study released by Strategy Analytics, the global cellular 
market will grow at an annual rate of 17% over the next five years, reaching $700 billion 
with 1.4 billion global wireless subscribers by 2005 (Strategy Analytics). 
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M-commerce is not a simple duplication of e-commerce upon wireless devices. 
As pointed out by market research institutions including Goldman Sachs (2000) and Bear 
Stearns (2001), “m-commerce is about information and transactions that are timely.” 
Is wireless infrastructure ready for time-sensitive m-commerce? From a 
technological perspective, it is ready for anytime, anywhere access. 3G wireless 
technology also enables high-speed access. However from a security perspective, time-
sensitive m-commerce is vulnerable to network delays or even network denial caused by 
a dangerous type of security problem – the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack 
– that has been much publicized but seldom understood completely (Geng and Whinston 
2000, Internet Security Systems). 
Due to the time-sensitive nature of m-commerce, it is not surprising for wireless 
infrastructure providers to carefully plan the radio spectrum allocation and pricing to 
avoid any predictable congestion. Given the huge cost of radio spectrum rights, they also 
have enough incentive to defend against most security risks through constant and prompt 
patching of system security holes and real-time monitoring. These remedies, however, 
target unauthorized intrusions. A DDoS attack, on the other hand, never tries to break 
into the victim’s system. On the wired Internet, attacks against well-known sites (Fisher 
and Callaghan 2001, Haney 2001, Hopper 2000) have repeatedly proved the lack of an 
effective defense. As Geng and Whinston (2000) pointed out, effective defense is 
unlikely to appear on the present wired Internet as there lacks an incentive structure to 
push cooperation on the wired Internet. 
DDoS attacks are not a serious problem to the current wireless Internet, in part 
because of the extremely limited and often non-programmable functionalities of current 
mobile devices. However, our research strongly suggests that DDoS attacks can be a real 
threat in the near future given the increasing computational power, network bandwidth, 
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and users in the wireless Internet economy. Two significant events have already occurred. 
First, in the summer of 2000, there appeared the first preliminary virus against mobile 
phones (Dennis 2000). Furthermore, Eugene Kaspersky, head of anti-virus research at 
Kaspersky Lab, a Moscow-based anti-virus company, once commented on this virus: 
“This is not the first and obviously not the last security breach discovered in 
mobile phones. Moreover, I believe as more functionality is added to mobile phones, it 
will result in more breaches being found.” 
The second event was the emergence of the first DDoS attack tool toward mobile 
phones, known as the SMS flooder (Sherriff 2000). It tries to use the wired Internet to 
attack a wireless victim. First it proliferates through Microsoft Outlook just as the 
Melissa virus (see http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-04.html for details) does. 
Then it commands all infected Microsoft Outlook software to send short messages (SMS-
messages) to a certain victim’s mobile phone to inundate it. The potential hazard is not 
only in the blocking of communications but also in the high financial cost if pricing is 
usage-based. 
The two events mentioned above show that the DDoS attack directed towards the 
wireless Internet is not only a theoretical possibility, but also a real and evolving threat. 
However, research is lacking as to what forms DDoS attacks against the wireless Internet 
will possibly take and how they can be defended effectively – technologically, 
economically and in terms of cost. This article tries to answer these two questions. We 
start by briefly reviewing the mechanism of DDoS attacks in section 2. 
In section 3, we analyze new features of the wireless Internet infrastructure and 
possible DDoS attack forms. Since various standards for the wireless Internet are still 
emerging, we discuss three infrastructure schemes – the Wireless Extended Internet, the 
Wireless Portal Network, and the Wireless Ad Hoc Network. Intuitively, possible forms 
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of DDoS attacks include not only ones that are found on the wired Internet – e.g., 
attacking e-business servers – but also new forms such as attacking the radio spectrum 
that is naturally a scarce resource. Another new attack form is the attack across both the 
wireless and wired Internet. Given the differences in computational power and the 
bandwidth between wired and wireless devices, it is easier for an attacker to use wired 
devices to initiate cross platform attacks toward wireless devices. 
Section 4 proposes a conceptual model for defending against wireless DDoS 
attacks. In this model, we address three issues. First, we consider technological solutions 
based on the analysis of possible attacks. Secondly, we evaluate economic costs and 
benefits involved in motivating the usage of these technological solutions. As the attacks 
in February 2000 have shown, the biggest barrier in defending against DDoS attacks is 
the lack of economic incentives for Internet users to cooperate (Geng and Whinston 
2000). The third is the implementation issue – i.e., how to construct both technological 
solutions and incentive structures in a cost-effective way. Section 5 concludes this article. 
MECHANISM OF DDOS ATTACKS 
The DDoS attack is the most advanced form of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. 
As the name suggests, the DDoS attack is distinguished from other DoS attacks by its 
ability to deploy its weapons in a “distributed” way over the Internet and to aggregate 
these forces to create lethal traffic. What drives hackers to move DoS attack tools to the 
distributed level is the ever-increasing security in potential victims’ systems in this cat-
and-mouse game. Figure 2.1 outlines the evolution of both attacks and defenses. For a 
detailed explanation see (Geng and Whinston 2000). 
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Figure 2.1. The evolution of attacks and defenses in DoS attacks. 
Although the presence of bugs in network software makes the most primitive DoS 
attacks still viable, e-businesses are more sensitive and prompt than before in protecting 
their system security by using intrusion detection software and by applying patches. As a 
result, the most frequent and harmful DoS attacks are in distributed form. DDoS attacks 
are distinct from all prior DoS attacks in that they never try to break into the victim’s 
system, thus making any security defense irrelevant. There are numerous variances of 
DDoS attack tools, all of which share a similar structure. 
A typical DDoS attack structure is shown in Figure 2.2. The attacker first gets 
control of several master computers by hacking into them. Then the master computers 
further get control of more daemon computers (also called zombie computers), often by 
using some automatic intrusion software. Such a hierarchical structure is difficult to trace 
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back. Finally, a command from the attacker can synchronize all daemons to send junk 
traffic to the victim, often a well-known site in e-commerce, to effectively jam its 
entrance and block access by legitimate users. 
 
Figure 2.2. A typical DDoS attack structure. 
In practice, various DDoS tools differ in terms of the hierarchical structure, 
attacking packets generated, corresponding attacking targets, and the encryption of 
communication. For a more comprehensive list and analysis, see Packet Storm at 
http://packetstorm.securify.com/ and David Dittrich’s articles at 
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos/. It is worth noting that all these DDoS 
attack tools are available in source codes on the Internet and new versions keep 
emerging. New and “improved” versions are more complicated in the way they conceal 
attacking traffic and in encryption methods, making the defense more difficult. 
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For the wired Internet, Geng and Whinston (2000) show that three problems lead 
to the proliferation of DDoS attacks: the insecure Internet, a lack of an effective way to 
control junk traffic, and IP spoofing. 
INFRASTRUCTURES OF WIRELESS INTERNET AND DDOS ATTACKS 
Two aspects differentiate the wireless Internet from the wired Internet. From a 
technological perspective, differences between wired and wireless networks are due to 
link characteristics and user mobility (Naghshineh et al. 1996). Compared to coaxial 
cable, DSL, and fiber, the wireless link is characterized by high cost, volatility, high error 
rates and relatively small transmission capacity. Because of shared radio spectrum, 
communication can be interfered by competing users, other equipment, evil intent 
hackers, or even natural phenomena. In terms of user mobility, the user–network 
interface (UNI) in a wireless environment keeps changing throughout the duration of a 
connection. 
From an economic perspective, the wireless infrastructure is likely to be an 
oligopolistic market, while the wired infrastructure is open to competition. The wireless 
infrastructure market is dominated by a few cellular phone carriers and wireless 
equipment providers with different communication standards and private technologies. In 
addition, the high cost of radio spectrum licenses and geographic constraints make an 
entry to the wireless access market difficult. 
Based on different application models, the wireless Internet can be categorized 
into three different infrastructures: the Wireless Extended Internet, the Wireless Portal 
Network and the Wireless Ad Hoc Network. The Wireless Extended Internet is merely an 
extension of the wired Internet for mobility convenience. Wireless Portal Networks are 
developed and privately owned by wireless telecommunication providers, thus are highly 
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centralized. Unlike the former two, Wireless Ad Hoc Networks have no client-server 
structure. 
Wireless Extended Internet 
In theWireless Extended Internet, wireless technology is used only for the last 
mile. Wireless access providers, or wireless ISPs, connect mobile devices to fixed 
networks via radio frequency (RF) channels. The traditional Client/Server architecture, as 
well as existing transport layer protocols (usually TCP), is also used for the Wireless 
Extended Internet. Therefore, DDoS attacks seen in the wired Internet are still feasible in 
the Wireless Extended Internet. 
Attacking devices using aggregated traffic 
Tens of millions of cellular phones, laptops and palmtops are expected to use 
wireless connections to access the Internet in the near future. Although transmission rates 
in wireless networks are much lower than those in wired networks, potential DDoS 
attacks are still feasible if large population of mobile units are involved. Thus, wireless 
data packet traffic is a potential avenue for DDoS attacks. 
Attacking the asymmetric structure  
Mobile devices have less computation and communication capabilities than those 
of fixed devices. A DDoS attack, even launched by a small number of powerful fixed 
computers, can effortlessly disable a large range of mobile devices. Wireless Internet 
content servers – such as WAP, wireless game, and mail (instant message) servers – are 
often optimized for small throughput and timely response. Thus, they are especially 
vulnerable to DDoS attacks compared with traditional wired servers. 
Furthermore, there may emerge new forms of DDoS attacks taking advantage of 
new characteristics of the wireless communication. 
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Attacking the radio spectrum 
The limited availability of radio spectrum is always the bottleneck in a wireless 
network. Even if license-free RF bands (such as the ISM band in the US) are used and 
micro-cell and pico-cell technologies are employed to expand transmission rates, it is still 
a scarce resource as the number of users and the demand for bandwidth increase. 
Technological research on wireless bandwidth allocation and admission control relies on 
stochastic theories, assuming that users will not use their devices all at the same time. 
Therefore, the total communication bandwidth can be far less than the total 
communication capacity of all wireless devices. However, a DDoS attack deliberately 
coordinates wireless devices to send out synchronized traffic, which can easily consume 
all spectrum resources or at least significantly reduce the capacity of communication 
channels for normal traffic. 
Avoiding tracing back by mobility 
The IETF Mobile IP protocol is a significant step towards enabling nomadic 
Internet users. Most research on security in Mobile IP deals with registration, 
authentication, key management and encryption. However, Mobile IP still has flaws that 
DDoS attackers can use in addition to conventional security problems. For example, the 
Mobile IP protocol requires two IP addresses: the home address and the care-of address. 
The home address is permanently assigned to a mobile device, while the care-of address 
is temporarily assigned by the visiting foreign network. Similar to IP-spoofing, the 
Mobile IP protocol allows a mobile device to send out IP datagrams using its fixed home 
address even if it roams away. Some extensions of Mobile IP are also sources of concern. 
For example, the Non-Disclosure Method (NDM) prevents the tracking of user 
movements by third parties and gives mobile users control over the revelation of their 
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location information, according to their personal security demands (Fasbender et al. 
1996). As a result, victim sites will find it difficult to trace sources of DDoS attacks. 
Wireless Portal Network 
Learning from America Online’s success, most wireless operators are using 
various “walled garden” and partnership approaches. Since they own coveted spectrum 
licenses and cellular phone user bases, these operators have strong bargaining power over 
all their business partners. Therefore, they are in a better position to secure additional 
revenue streams, including slotting fees for portal placement, a slice of m-commerce 
revenues, and fees from location-based services. Such an extension of their business will 
transform them into wireless portals (see Figure 2.3). The most cited example is NTT 
DoCoMo, for which 5.9 million users signed up with its i-mode service during the last 
four months of 2000. 
Figure 2.3. The architecture of the Wireless Portal Network 
The Wireless Portal Network is based on the typical Client/Server architecture. 
Mobile clients (usually cellular phones, smart phones, and specific PDAs) embedded 
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with compact Operating Systems communicate with base stations through wireless 
packet-switched data networks. All requests are passed to the service center through the 
telephone network and signaling systems. Similar to the Service Control Point (SCP) in 
an Intelligent Network, the service center keeps user information and provides portal 
services, contracted services, and public Internet services. Portal services are kernel 
services in a Wireless Portal Network, which maintain user profiles and billing databases 
and provide location-based service and other real-time services. Application requests and 
responses will not be encapsulated in IP packets. Thus, they have the lowest latency. For 
contracted services, the requests are translated into TCP/IP protocol streams by the 
TCP/IP gateway and served by contracted content providers. Dedicated lines and 
reserved paths guarantee security and QoS. For public Internet services, Internet access 
requests will be passed from edge routers to the backbone. 
Clients, contracted content providers, and the service center become a walled 
community, i.e., a reliable “security island”. This architecture is more secure than the 
Wireless Extended Internet because a Portal Network screens all clients and most servers 
located in the public Internet. It is difficult to launch attacks from outside the island. 
However, with increasingly powerful phones, such as Java phones that could be infected 
with DDoS zombie viruses, the network could be vulnerable to internal attacks. 
Attacking the radio spectrum 
Because Wireless Portal Networks primarily employ existing cellular phone 
systems (single-hop), a base station is the only entry to a specified cell. In major cities 
and crowded airports, it is common to have calls dropped in mid-sentence. Sometimes 
making a connection is impossible. Mimicking this natural congestion, it is possible to 
disable a particular base station – e.g., the one serving an important conference nearby – 
by simultaneously sending connection requests and a mass of traffic from mobile 
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zombies. As a result, all wireless devices within this cell will not be able to connect to the 
network. In some cases, even control channels can be blocked. In a Personal 
Communications Services (PCS) Network, when a Visitor Location Register (VLR) fails 
and broadcasts a re-registration request to all Mobile Stations (MSs), registration 
messages sent by MSs will cause a natural traffic jam (and thus, collisions) in the reverse 
Digital Control Channel (DCCH) (Haas and Lin 2000). Therefore, if the MSs have more 
control over the DCCH, they can block the channel and make VLR busy with 
recognizing fake identities. Then the traffic channel will be of no use even if it is 
available. 
Attacking TCP/IP gateway 
The TCP/IP gateway translates between wireless bearer protocols and the Internet 
TCP/IP protocols. It is one crucial bottleneck in the Wireless Portal Network. Abundant 
computing capability and enough links are extremely important for it to provide a 
security protection for mobile terminals and inner servers against attacks from the public 
Internet. If one has to shut down the gateway, the Wireless Portal Network will be 
isolated from the public Internet and make all outside services unavailable. 
Attacking value-added services 
It is difficult to attack value-added services since dedicated lines will be used for 
such crucial services as banking and trading and some content servers are embedded into 
portal services, like location services. All these services are invisible outside the portal 
networks and will survive under outside DDoS flooding. However, there might be 
sophisticated methods to launch attacks from devices within the portal network. 
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Wireless Ad Hoc Network 
A Wireless Ad Hoc Network (also called multihop network or Peer-to-peer 
wireless network) is formed temporarily by a group of mobile devices, which have a 
common mission or interest. Adhering to a strict admission policy and communication 
rules, all these devices form a special community of equals to share information. There is 
no designated client or server. All members communicate over wireless channels directly 
without any fixed networking infrastructure or centralized administration. In this 
structure, all mobile hosts communicate with each other in a wireless multi-hop routing 
style. Each mobile node maintains all the links within the defined radius (called zone) 
and acts as a router in the network. If a member is out of its destination member’s zone or 
it is not in a line-of-sight, all messages between them must pass through one or more 
routers. All members are free to move around and join and leave a network at will 
without any technical difficulties, subject to admission control. The routing scheme is 
adjusted dynamically according to the changing network topology. 
Analogous to the Internet that evolved from the simple DARPA net, the Wireless 
Ad Hoc Network has the potential to grow into a World Wide Wireless interconnected 
network. Wireless Ad Hoc Networks were first recognized as an important issue in the 
military communications arena in the 70’s. Several systems have been deployed for the 
Tactical Data Systems, such as Link-16 in the US Navy Airborne and Shipboard systems. 
Following the wide deployment of mature wireless technologies, the Wireless Ad Hoc 
Network is receiving more attention for commercial applications, such as team 
collaboration applications, networking intelligent sensors and cooperative robots, etc. 
The Ad Hoc Network is the best architecture against DDoS attacks. First and 
foremost, it has no central server. Secondly, it may implement strict admission policies 
making it very hard for outsiders to hack into the communication infrastructure. Multi-
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hopping reduces transmitter power and protects network capacity via spatial reuse. 
Because there is no central point and no crucial resource, any blocked route can be 
substituted by redundant links. In addition, the community can reject an abnormal 
member by voting based on certain admission policies. Dynamic routing protocols and 
mobility of the network components give Ad Hoc Networks a self-adjusting capability 
under attacks. 
It is unlikely that the Wireless Ad Hoc Network will be restricted to a small 
geographical region. Hybrid architecture could be used to expand the range of such 
networks. Members can communicate with one another via the local RF network within a 
regional wireless community, and with other members located anywhere within reach of 
the commercial telephone system through wired relay services. With the help of the dual-
membership hosts, interconnecting different communities will result in the World Wide 
Wireless network. Wireless communities can also be attached to conventional fixed data 
networks to expand application possibilities. For instance, home-networked appliances 
based on Bluetooth technology can be remotely controlled through the Internet. For 
military use, a complete networking system, called the AEGIS Broadcast Network, has 
been implemented for tactical data systems in the US Navy. It connects, monitors, and 
controls all military units on both coasts, the Gulf of Mexico, Japan, etc. The 
interconnection among Wireless Ad Hoc Networks through wired relay services creates a 
complex network topology, in which critical points can be attacked. First, attacks against 
dual-membership hosts may effectively disable the interconnections among different Ad 
Hoc Networks. Secondly, directory services, which are indispensable for large scale 
interconnected Ad Hoc Networks, are also possible targets for DDoS attacks. This is 
similar to the case in the Internet where DNS servers and catalog servers are frequent 
targets of DDoS attacks. In a word, the World WideWireless network could be subject to 
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all forms of DDoS attacks that exist on the Internet if it evolves towards an asymmetric 
infrastructure. 
DEFENDING AGAINST DDOS ATTACKS ON THE WIRELESS INTERNET 
In the event of a typical DDoS attack, the victim alone cannot effectively defend 
herself/himself. Cooperation among all involved parties is indispensable. Figure 2.4 
presents our conceptual model for defending against a DDoS attack, which illustrates a 
two-layer coordinated defense problem and an implementation problem. 
Figure 2.4. The conceptual model for defending against the DDoS attack 
In the two-layer coordinated defense problem, the first layer focuses on effective 
coordinated technological solutions. The second layer deals with the incentive 
mechanism that, in an economic perspective, makes people involved in a DDoS attack 
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feel that cooperating with each other is the best strategy. In past practice, unfortunately, 
little attention has been paid to this second layer problem compared with the public focus 
on technologies. Ironically, this incentive problem causes the most headaches in practice 
(Geng and Whinston 2000). As a solution, we propose to use usage-based fees as the 
foundation of the incentive mechanism. 
The objective of the implementation problem is cost effectiveness, which arises as 
a crucial problem because defending against DDoS attacks may require an overhaul of 
the current network infrastructure. For instance, the implementation of a usage-based fee 
scheme on the wireless Internet – as well as on the wired Internet if we consider the 
cross-border attacks between the wired and wireless Internet – has strong demands on the 
network’s ability to audit and manage traffic. As an illustrative example, we present an 
implementation scheme based on the Policy Based Networking (PBN) framework. 
Coordinated technological solutions 
There are four types of coordinated technological solutions, as shown in Figure 
2.5. 
Two comments are necessary for Figure 2.5. First, different solutions can coexist 
to achieve a better defense. For example, user-level traffic control and coordinated filters 
can be implemented simultaneously to be more effective. Second, as in the wired Internet 
example, coordination is often required to be global, whereas in the wireless Internet case 
local coordination may suffice. For example, to avoid an attack on radio frequencies in a 
certain geographical area, it is sufficient to require coordination only among involved 
wireless devices and base stations in that area. Below we analyze the characteristics of 
these four coordinated technological solutions. 
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Figure 2.5. Four coordinated technological solutions to DDoS attacks. 
Improving the security of all relevant devices 
Before initiating an effective DDoS attack, the attacker needs to break into 
enough zombie devices to secure an ability to generate sufficient traffic. A direct 
counterstrike is to secure all devices to make it difficult for the attacker to seize enough 
zombies. 
It is not practical, nor potentially beneficial, to secure all computers on the wired 
Internet. Alternatively, an effective and efficient solution would be to selectively secure 
those computers that have high traffic throughput – such as routers – or high performance 
  45
and high bandwidth workstations so that the marginal benefit for each dollar spent on 
security is optimized. Moreover, for some networks that have the ability to audit real-
time traffic, security measures can even be delayed until a DDoS attack actually happens, 
thus making them more targeted and therefore more efficient. 
For the wireless Internet, such a selective security implies that wireless devices 
with high bandwidth connections, e.g., 3G devices, are the ones that should be 
safeguarded. We note that the wireless communication industry has a tighter security 
tradition than the wired Internet community, partially because of the relatively large 
communication spectrum and device costs. 
User-level traffic control 
User-level traffic control is embodied in a set of traffic control rules specifically 
for a given network device. For example, a wireless device user can set up a daily traffic 
cap that is high enough not to disturb her/his normal usage, while abnormally large traffic 
will be stopped. Furthermore, the abnormal traffic may trigger a warning to the user or to 
a network administrator for follow-up diagnosis. Traffic control rules can be contingent 
on factors including other users’ usage status. For example, a user can specify her/his 
data to be dropped or delayed if the network is experiencing congestion. 
Geng and Whinston (2000) propose to use an e-stamp model to control traffic 
even if user devices are hacked. A direct implication is that user-level traffic control rules 
for a specific network device need to be protected more securely than the network device 
itself since we do not want the attacker to modify the traffic control rules once she/he gets 
control of a network device. For the wired Internet, Geng and Whinston propose to save 
the rules in edge routers because routers, given their concentrated and limited 
functionalities, are relatively easier to protect than other computers. 
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For the wireless Internet, the candidate host for traffic control rules can be 
flexible. Unlike desktop computers that are normally anonymous with concealed identity, 
wireless devices – especially wireless phones – have unique IDs or PINs that are 
transmitted along with the data which cannot be tampered with. These IDs or PINs can be 
used to identify wireless devices. Furthermore, unlike desktop computers in which 
software programs can control and modify virtually all information including the traffic 
control information, wireless devices normally have restricted access functions that 
enable secure traffic control even if the wireless device is hacked. 
Edge routers in the Wireless Extended Internet and gateways in the Wireless 
Portal Network are the ideal hosts for coordinating user-level traffic control rules. For 
example, if a user wants her/his data packets to be dropped when the outbound network 
of the wireless ISP is congested, the edge router has the ability to realize this 
requirement. The designation of a host for traffic control rule coordination is complicated 
in a Wireless Ad Hoc Network since no one party is more likely to be in a central 
position than another. 
Coordinated filters and tracing back 
Even when user-level traffic control fails, wireless ISPs in the Wireless Extended 
Internet can still try to defeat DDoS attacks by identifying the attacking traffics and 
stopping them by using coordinated filters. The purpose of coordination among filters is 
to stop the traffic as early as possible along the attacking paths to prevent the damage 
from aggregated traffic. In a Wireless Portal Network, due to the relatively simple 
network topology, coordinated filters can be simplified to only one single filter. For a 
Wireless Ad Hoc Network, filtering is not applicable due to the symmetric structure. 
However, community rules, e.g., a voting mechanism, may play the role of a central filter 
to decide which user device to block. 
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Even if the coordinated filters cannot effectively stop the attack, possibly because 
the attacking traffic is hard to distinguish from normal traffic, there still exists another 
technological solution – to trace back to the zombie devices (and possibly the attacker) to 
shut down the attack from the source. Combining this with possible legal actions, this 
method can also help to deter repeated attacks. 
A consistent incentive structure 
According to the Yankee Group, a Boston consulting firm, the DDoS attack in 
February 2000 cost approximately $1.2 billion, not to mention the damage to consumer 
confidence in e-commerce (Murphy 2000). Effective coordinated solutions to DDoS 
attacks are critical for the future of e-commerce and m-commerce. However, a fervent 
advocacy of coordinated solutions does not necessarily result in actual implementation. 
Sample research by icsa.net, for example, shows that less than 15 percent of all corporate 
users are filtering source IP addresses. An even smaller percentage of Internet service 
providers – less than 8 percent – are doing this type of filtering (ICSA.Net 2000). 
A disincentive structure for the wired internet 
 The reason for this low rate of implementation of coordinated solutions is the 
inconsistent incentive structure in Internet traffic pricing. Simply stated, the victim has 
the incentive to defend but cannot defend effectively, whereas the owners of zombie 
computers and ISPs can defend effectively but do not have the incentive to do so. In this 
time of flat monthly fee payments for wired Internet access, the owner of a zombie 
computer incurs little cost due to DDoS attacks since all that is stolen is just some traffic. 
On the other hand, preventing a personal computer from being controlled by any potential 
attacker requires frequent – virtually constant – monitoring and updating, at considerable 
cost. If the cost of protection is higher than the value of the traffic being protected, an 
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economic disincentive clearly exists. Similar logic applies to ISPs who can always collect 
the monthly fees no matter whether a DDoS attack happens or not. Thus, they may 
hesitate to install filters since they will lower network performance. 
Who should be motivated to defend in the wireless Internet? 
Having observed the failed incentive structure of the wired Internet, it is clear that 
the wireless infrastructure should contain a new incentive structure that can give wireless 
device owners and ISPs enough impetus to implement defense mechanisms. However, an 
efficient incentive structure need not target all wireless device owners – only high-
bandwidth devices should be effectively protected, including: 
 high-performance, high-bandwidth end-user devices (including wired devices 
that can communicatewith the wireless Internet), 
 routers, and backbone switches. 
As we mentioned before the possibility of attacking the Wireless Extended 
Internet from the wired counterpart, the incentive structure is also need for devices in the 
wired Internet. As wired devices generally have more communication capacity, the 
incentive structure for the wired network needs to be more strict. 
 
Table 2.1. i-mode pricing scheme (US $1 = Japan ¥123.5 as of July 12, 2001) 
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An incentive structure based on usage-based fees  
One candidate for an effective incentive structure is the usage-based fee. The 
direct effect of a usage-based fee is a sharp increase in the cost to zombie devices if they 
are sending out attacking traffic. In particular, if a proper fee increase scheme is devised, 
it should not affect normal network usage but the cost could increase significantly for 
high-performance, high bandwidth devices when they are sending out huge traffic 
volume. 
These computers are most often located in corporations, governments, and 
universities. With a usage-based fee structure, the owners of such computers will have 
the greatest immediate incentive to take security actions. Similarly in the wireless 
Internet, devices that have the potential to occupy a large portion of the radio frequency 
will be controlled most tightly. Likewise, a usage-based fee between an ISP and a 
backbone provider encourages the ISP to have more concern over its traffic. Specifically, 
such a usage-based fee plan makes ISPs more likely to install coordinated filters and to 
support user-level traffic controls. 
Fortunately and unlike the wired Internet industry, the wireless Internet industry 
starts with usage-based fees. For example, Japanese vendor DoKoMo’s i-mode service 
pricing is mainly packet based, as shown in Table 2.1. 
US wireless providers are using minute-based pricing plans that are often 
simplified (as we will explain shortly) to the form of fixed pricing with an over-the-cap 
penalty for several service levels. Currently given the low bandwidth and simple 
functions of wireless devices in the US, simple pricing schemes based on connection time 
are applicable. However, it is conceivable that with the increase of bandwidth and more 
rich applications with different traffic requirements, and more importantly with the 
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migration to packet-based communication, packet-based pricing will become more 
accurate and practical than minute-based pricing. 
The wireless Internet: Towards dynamic usage-based fees. 
If the usage-based fee continues in the wireless Internet, we can expect less DDoS 
attacks compared with the wired Internet. A usage-based fee can be further calibrated to 
provide more targeted incentives against DDoS attacks, i.e., a dynamic usage-based fee 
plan can better prevent DDoS attacks than constant usage-based fees (CREC, Goldman 
Sachs 2000). A constant usage based fee scheme has a fixed unit price. Packet-based 
pricing is an example of the constant usage-based fee, while the dynamic usage-based fee 
implies a changing unit price, which is higher when there is congestion in the network 
(Goldman Sachs 2000). 
Wireless service providers (as well as long-distance phone providers) have 
already considered predictable congestion for their constant usage-based fee scheme. For 
example, it is a common practice to price higher for daytime communication than for 
nighttime or weekend communication as congestion is more likely to happen in daytime. 
We call this the modified constant usage-based fee scheme. 
A dynamic usage-based fee scheme, on the other hand, deals with unpredictable 
congestions, including those caused by DDoS attacks. The characteristic of a dynamic 
usage based fee is the increase in unit price when congestion happens or will happen. The 
incentive it gives to wireless device owners is twofold. First, those owners are more 
likely to set up traffic control rules in their device to instruct to delay or cancel the data 
transmission when the network is congested or approaching congestion. Therefore, even 
if an attacker instruct all zombie devices to send attacking traffic at the same time, an 
effectively synchronized attack is unlikely to occur. Second, as congestion means higher 
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cost, high bandwidth owners are more likely to invest more in the security of their 
devices to avoid stolen traffic. 
 
Table 2.2. Different usage-based fee schemes. 
 
 
Table 2.3. Variations of constant usage-based fees. 
Table 2.2 gives a concise comparison of three usage-based fee schemes. 
Usage-based fees can be flexible 
It is constantly questioned whether or not users will accept a usage-based fee plan 
even when it is financially beneficial for them. Some researches (Odlyzko2001) show 
that many people dislike the uncertainty and complexity associated with usage-based 
fees. Concerning this problem, it is worth pointing out that a consistent incentive 
structure can be flexible in its form while still representing the essence of a usage-based 
fee plan, as illustrated in Table 2.3. 
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For the Wireless Ad Hoc Network, a monetary incentive structure may not be 
available simply because of the lack of a charging system. Instead, other incentive 
mechanisms, e.g., a voting mechanism which effectively rules out a member upon heavy 
radio frequency usage, can serve the same purpose. 
Once again, for defending the Wireless Extended Internet, a usage-based fee plan 
is also needed for the wired Internet. Nevertheless a usage-based fee plan for the wired 
Internet is mainly used to prevent DDoS attacks inside the wired Internet, for which Geng 
and Whinston (2000) have discussed possible mechanisms. 
Cost-effectiveness 
The history of the Internet shows that the de facto criteria for success in any 
proposal are whether that solution is proactive and consistent with mainstream and 
commercial Internet technologies. Because of the anonymous and “best effort” usage of 
the Internet, it is arduous and costly to regulate the infrastructure against DDoS attacks. 
Several advanced network management technologies have been proposed to address the 
traffic control problem. Employing these existing technologies will significantly reduce 
the costs and risks in designing future wireless Internet. 
The Policy Based Networking (PBN) (Yavatkar et al. 2000) is one promising 
technology for implementing usage-based fees to deal with DDoS attacks. Essentially, it 
provides rules that describe actions to take when specific conditions arise. These policies 
are able to control critical network resources such as bandwidth, QoS, security and Web 
access across heterogeneous networks. Thus, both natural and artificial congestions are 
under the control of a globally coordinated structure. As illustrated in Figure 2.6, we 
present an implementation scheme based on the PBN, and discuss how to incorporate 




Figure 2.6. A wireless network architecture based on the PBN 
In this scheme, the two main elements for policy control are the Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP) and the Policy Decision Point (PDP) (Yavatkar et al. 2000). 
From the PBN perspective, the Wireless Location Register/Authentication Center is a 
natural policy server (i.e., PDP) with additional functionality such as user authentication, 
accounting, and policy information storage. At network border points, PEPs act as a 
“police” to accept or deny requests appropriately. Through secure and reliable channels 
(such as telecommunication out-of-band signaling network), PDPs and PEPs can 
exchange policy information with the Common Open Policy Service protocol (COPS) 
(Boyle et al. 2000). 
At the user’s end, with the Intelligent IC card and other hardware technologies, 
wireless devices have some embedded functionalities that cannot be tampered with. The 
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user-end policies have three levels. First, providers can deploy policies in terminals 
which users cannot change. Unlike desktop computers that are normally anonymous in 
the sense that they can conceal their identities, wireless devices such as wireless phones 
have unique IDs, or PINs, that are transmitted along with the data and cannot be altered. 
These IDs or PINs are effective instruments to identify wireless devices. Also, there are 
restricted access functions, such as integrating admission control into lower layer traffic 
control to increase the performance and security (Das et al 2000). These restrictions can 
enable secure traffic control of all relevant devices even if these devices are hacked. 
Second, end users could design their own policies, which are unchangeable by 
applications. For example, a user can assign a daily cap in traffic for her/his cellular 
phone. If the cap is reached, the system could block any further transaction and/or raise 
an alarm. In fact, the pre-paid cellular phone card implements a similar traffic-cap 
function. Future mobile phone users can set rules that are more sophisticated. 
The above two policy controls cannot be realized without specific hardware that is 
configurable only by providers or end users. A third level policy control can be 
constructed in software by enabling a wireless operating system to have multiple security 
levels. Policy control is realized in higher security levels that normal networking 
applications cannot modify. 
Finally, at the Intranet border point, TCP/IP gateways play the role of policy 
proxies. Proper policy rules can turn these proxies into coordinated filters and even 
support advanced usage-based fee schemes, such as dynamic pricing. The entities 
involved in policy control can verify each other’s identity and establish necessary trust 
links before communicating. With the help of standard PEPs on Internet edge routers, a 
global coordinated network will be formed to minimize theft and DDoS threats. 
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A usage-based fee scheme can be implemented by using PDPs and PEPs, for 
example, in the following way. First, once the fee scheme is decided, it is implemented as 
a set of policies in PDPs at the Wireless Authentication Centers. Secondly based on the 
fee scheme and the real-time traffic condition, a PDP decides the pricing rules for every 
related mobile terminal and send these rules as policies to PEPs on these mobile 
terminals. Thirdly PEPs on mobile terminals enforce these pricing rules. Whenever there 
is a surge in traffic, possibly caused by DDoS attacks, PEPs report the traffic change and 
any possible congestion to the coordinating PDP, who in return dynamically adjusts 
pricing rules according to the given fee scheme and instructs PEPs to update their pricing 
rules. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The DDoS attack threatens all time-sensitive m-commerce services. Fortunately 
the wireless Internet currently has a distinctive advantage over the wired Internet in 
defending against the DDoS attack: the timing. When DDoS attacks came to the wired 
Internet, the infrastructure of the wired Internet had been stable for decades, albeit 
lacking reliable mechanisms for QoS control and incentive structures for traffic control. 
As a result, it was repeatedly targeted by DDoS attacks. In comparison, the wireless 
Internet industry has a chance to address DDoS attacks before it fully matures. However, 
time is running short as a well-founded wireless Internet infrastructure is expected to 
emerge by 2003 (Goldman Sachs 2000). Whether potential DDoS attacks on the wireless 
Internet will materialize or not will solely depend on how the wireless industry deals with 
the potential problem when solutions can still be embedded into the basic infrastructure. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DYNAMICS OF ONLINE PEER-TO-PEER 
COMMUNITIES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF MUSIC 
SHARING NETWORK AS AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME 
Online peer-to-peer communities and online social network have become 
increasingly popular.  In particular, the recent boost of online peer-to-peer communities 
leads to exponential growth in sharing of user-contributed content which have brought 
profound changes to business and economic practices. Understanding the dynamics and 
sustainability of such peer-to-peer communities has important implications for business 
managers. In this study, we explore the structure of online sharing communities from the 
dynamic process perspectives.  We build an evolutionary game model to capture the 
dynamics of online peer-to-peer communities.  Using online music sharing data collected 
from one of the IRC Channels for over five years, we empirically investigate the model 
which underlies the dynamics of the music sharing community.  Our empirical results 
show strong support for the evolutionary process of the community.  We find the two 
major parties in the community, namely sharers and downloaders, are influencing each 
other in their dynamics of evolvement in the community.  The combination of the 
dynamics reveals the mechanism through which peer-to-peer communities sustain and 
thrive in a constant changing environment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent explosive growth of popular online peer-to-peer sharing communities 
(e.g., YouTube for video sharing, Flickr for photo sharing, and Digg for news sharing) 
has generated a renewed interest in the Internet as a new medium for content generation 
and distribution.  This new trend is often considered to be attributable to the Web 2.0 
technologies (e.g. Ajax, XML, RSS, and Wiki) and social computing concepts (e.g.  
blogging, tagging, and voting) that make mass user interactions feasible and multi-
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faceted.  Online sharing communities feature large populations of participants and 
constant change of community memberships.  The communities also develop and sustain 
mainly by themselves without any corporate or commercial sponsorship.  Individual users 
self-organize and construct communities on the Internet through large-scale collaboration 
and information sharing, which bring significant changes to e-commerce practices and 
organizational computing.  Therefore, there is an increasing interest in understanding the 
structure and development of online social communities. 
In particular, online sharing communities have become a venue where users 
directly provide services and products to each other, providing a new form of market for 
consumers.  The development of online communities, however, challenges the traditional 
economic notion of market as participants merely are driven by costs and benefits with 
the sole objective of maximizing profits.  In online peer-to-peer sharing communities, 
users and providers interact with thousands of fellow community members with limited 
knowledge of counterparts.  Community participants often have few message exchanges 
and there are also few pre-existing social ties among them.  Moreover, most member 
interactions among very large community populations are short-lived, and the community 
is dynamic with constant changes.  These differences require a new approach for better 
understanding of the development and sustainability of online sharing communities. 
To model these dynamic individual interactions with limited information in online 
communities, in this paper we adopt the evolutionary game approach in order to 
accurately portray the dynamics and evolutionary process of online peer-to-peer 
communities.  Evolutionary game models (Samuelson 1997) emphasize large 
populations, continuous changes in community memberships, and imperfect information 
and memory among community members.  These models are particularly powerful in 
interpreting users’ behavior in online sharing communities (e.g.  Geng et al.  2004). In 
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this research, we formulate a stylized evolutionary game model to capture the structural 
change and the development process of peer-to-peer communities.  We then empirically 
test the evolutionary game model using over five years data collected from a major online 
music sharing community.  As predicted by the evolutionary game model, our results 
suggest that the users in the community do follow an evolutionary path in terms of the 
dynamics of their music sharing activities.  In particular, we find two dynamics which 
characterize the mechanism of development of sharers and downloaders accordingly.  
The combination of the two dynamics reveals the mechanism through which peer-to-peer 
communities sustain and thrive in a constant changing environment.  We find that when 
sharer ratio decreases below certain threshold, downloaders exit and new sharers join the 
communities. This process gradually restores equilibrium to the peer-to-peer network.   
Similarly, when share ratio increases above certain threshold, sharers start to exit while 
new downloaders join the community.  Remarkably, the dynamics also reveals the 
presence of a growth region where networks gain on both downloaders and sharers 
simultaneously.  Our empirical analysis quantifies the speed at which peer-to-peer 
networks evolve and recover.  We also demonstrate the similarity between the 
evolutionary game approach and the disequilibrium approach that has been used in prior 
studies.  We show both approaches provide a structured understanding of the dynamics of 
peer-to-peer networks and product similar empirical results despite their differences in 
underlying assumptions.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes 
related literature on online communities.  Section 3 provides an overview of online peer-
to-peer sharing community and discusses the advantages of evolutionary game in 
modeling social interaction and social communities.  Section 4 constructs a stylized 
evolutionary game model that motivates our empirical analysis.  Section 5 tests the model 
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empirically using data from IRC music sharing communities.  Section 6 compares the 
similarities and differences between the evolutionary game approach and the 
disequilibrium approach. Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of the results 
and implications as well as identifying future research opportunities. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our paper draws two main streams of literature that explore the dynamics of 
online communities. One stream investigates online communities at the aggregate level, 
while the other focuses on examining the communities at the individual level.  
Extant research taking the aggregate approach view online communities as a 
whole and examine the impact of overall community activities on the growth of the 
community. Among the first systematic studies, Butler (2001) examined the role of 
communication activity on membership size using data collected from Internet ListServs.  
He proposed a resource-based model that treats membership size and communication 
activity as resources and benefits of the community. The model also recognizes that the 
large number of participants and communication activities in the community may also 
incur costs to members. He found that as membership size grows, the community 
experiences a faster “churn” rate, i.e., the percentage of membership loss increases.  The 
results suggested that while more community activities provide more value to members in 
general, the net benefit does not increase monotonically. He thus cautions theorists and 
developers of online social structures to be aware of the opposing forces and the 
endogenous nature of membership size and communication activity, as well as their 
interplay, and adjust their expectations of the growth of a community accordingly. 
Asvanund et al. (2004) are among the first to empirically study costs and benefits 
in peer-to-peer (P2P) music-sharing communities. As with Butler (2001), they recognize 
that as the network grows, so do the benefits (more resource availability) and costs 
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(network congestion due to user free riding). By sending queries to six P2P networks, 
they collected query congestion, song availability and download delay data to measure 
the exact value of positive and negative network externalities. Although in a different 
context, their result is similar to Butler’s (2001) in that the marginal value brought by an 
additional user declines in larger networks, while the marginal costs imposed by the new 
user increases with size.  
Extant literature taking the aggregate approach illustrates the potential impact of 
overall community activities on the development of community. However, the underlying 
mechanisms driving individual participation in the community remain unclear. Another 
stream of literature on sharing incentives focuses on analyzing individual rationales to 
participate and contribute to online communities. Jones et al. (2004) studied the effect of 
individual messages and information richness in online forums on user interactions 
(replies) and propensity to stay. The results suggest that simpler messages may encourage 
more active participation from users. Based on the classical economic theory, researchers 
assume that individuals maximize their direct payoff in deciding whether to stay in a 
community (Asvanund et al. 2004). However, in addition to the direct payoff through 
messages exchange, files downloaded, and traffic redistribution (Krishnan et al. 2004), it 
is suggested that individuals may join the community because of their own psychological 
and social characteristics, such as satisfying user needs (Raymond 2000, Lakhani and 
Wolf 2005), reciprocity (Kollock 1999, Shah 2006) and altruism (Torvalds 1998, Hars 
and Ou 2001).   
In this paper, we combine the aggregate approach with the individual approach to 
model the dynamic evolution of a peer-to-peer network.  Our approach complements 
these earlier studies by focusing on the sustainability and dynamic changes in these 
networks.   
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PEER-TO-PEER COMMUNITIES AND EVOLUTIONARY GAME APPROACH 
The continual growth of the Internet and telecommunication networks boost up 
the recent development of peer-to-peer online sharing communities.  As a relatively new 
phenomenon, online peer-to-peer sharing communities are characterized by their user-
centered, content-based, quickly-expanded, and loosely-connected structure and 
development.  The growth of online communities challenges the traditional economic 
notion of the individual as a payoff maximization agent interacting with the market with 
full information and complete rationality.  In online communities, individuals no longer 
deal with products or services provided by a few monopolistic firms.  Instead, products 
(such as music and photo files) are provided by other members voluntarily in the 
community.  Users in the community are both providers and consumers.  As such, 
individual’s behavior and community development is influenced by the overall provision 
and consumption activities and the interactions among community members in the 
community.  In this research, we are particularly interested in exploring what are the 
underlying mechanisms of the dynamics and development of such user-centered 
communities.   
From social network and communication perspectives, we have limited 
understanding of the structure and dynamics of online social communities because of the 
highly dynamic and ad-hoc natures of interactions among members.  On the Internet, 
people interact with each other for information and content and they often have few pre-
existing connections.  In some cases, such as music/video sharing and Open Source 
Software (OSS) collaboration, they may not even have any direct communication.  
Instead of mutual social connections that link individuals together (Monge and 
Contractor 2003, pp. 156), the most important impact an online peer-to-peer community 
has on its members is through the individual’s observation of system characteristics and 
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aggregate behavior of all other users.  For example, in digg.com, popular ranking 
composed by readers’ votes determines the importance level for each piece of news and 
influences others’ reading preferences.  In order to understand these dynamics, we need 
to go beyond the traditional social network approach that focuses on characterizing the 
interactions and relationships among community members.   
Based on classical game theory, current research often assumes that individuals 
are fully rational about others and the market.  These assumptions cannot be applied to 
the user-centered online sharing communities.  In online peer-to-peer communities, 
heterogeneous members may have different and limited rationality.  Nonnecke et al. 
(2006) suggest that individual behavior (in MSN communities) is temporary and usually 
adapts to exogenous and endogenous factors.  In this scenario, the traditional game theory 
assumptions have limited power to characterize the dynamics of individual strategies. 
Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully 
rational and have complete knowledge of others and the market, three advantages make 
evolutionary games a preferable approach to study collective and dynamic influence in 
online user-centered communities.  Firstly, evolutionary game theory assumes that people 
decide their strategies gradually and adaptively.  They do not have to be rational and 
optimal.  Through trial and learning processes, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded 
out and equilibria may emerge (Samuelson 1997).  This selection mechanism captures the 
formation of collective behavior in online communities.  Secondly, evolutionary game 
theory has the ability to model changing population – one of the most important merits 
from the marriage of economics and biology.   This makes the evolutionary approach 
powerful in studying large and open communities.  Without restrictions on the number of 
players, evolutionary models can describe many membership dynamics, such as member 
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gain, loss, and dominance.  Finally, evolutionary game models focus on the convergence 
process from far-from-equilibrium instead of steady states near-equilibrium. 
In this paper, we take the initial step to investigate the underlying mechanism of 
the dynamics of online sharing communities using data collected from a major music 
sharing network.  Music sharing communities provide an excellent context for this study 
as music sharing network are by far the most popular online communities that have 
attracted the largest number of users (Asvanund et al. 2004).  Next section, we formulate 
a basic evolutionary game to characterize the dynamics of an online music sharing 
community with two major types of users, that is, the sharers who provide music files and 
the downloaders who search, request, and download music files. 
ONLINE SHARING COMMUNITIES AS EVOLUTIONARY GAMES 
Evolutionary game theory views a community as a collection of interactions 
between individuals over time.  The payoff for an individual in a given time period is 
determined by her strategy and the strategy of her counterpart, as in the traditional game 
theory framework.  Evolutionary game theory however differs from the traditional game 
theory with regard to its assumption of individual rationality.  Instead of having 
individuals choose strategies based on perfectly rational expectation of the future, 
evolutionary game theory imposes a lower requirement.  It assumes individuals are 
myopic and their choices of strategy are influenced only by their payoffs in the most 
recent time period (Taylor and Jonker 1978).  This process is called replicator dynamics.  
The lower requirement on rationality also suggests that individuals do not reach optimal 
strategy instantly.  Rather, it is a gradual process played out over time. 
  64
Population and payoffs in sharing communities 
In online sharing communities, we assume an individual makes two decisions.  
First, she decides whether she would like to share music files with other users of the peer-
to-peer network.  Second, she decides whether she would like to download music files 
from the network.  Individuals who decide to share music files are called sharers, while 
those who decide to download are called downloaders.  Evolutionary game theory 
requires the two decisions to be considered separately.  That is, sharers only provide 
resources to others while downloaders only download without contribution.  If an 
individual both share and download music files, the two decisions are assumed to be 
independent from each other.  Given the independence assumption, an individual that 
shares and downloads music files at the same time can be modeled as two individuals, 
one as a sharer and the other as a downloader.  We denote sharer’s subpopulation at time 
t as ( )Sx t  and downloader’s subpopulation as ( )Fx t . 
Both sharers and downloaders derive payoffs from the online peer-to-peer 
network.  Sharers take joy in sharing his or her music collection with others.  Such joy 
could come from community status, influence and self-perception.  The payoff received 
by each sharer may vary.  Sharers whose music files have been downloaded more 
frequently may receive a higher payoff than those whose files are downloaded less 
frequently.  Similarly, downloaders receive payoff in obtaining music downloads.  Those 
who have obtained more downloads could receive higher payoff than others.  To model 
the behavior of the population that consists of such heterogeneous individuals, 
evolutionary game theory assumes that the population is large and the interactions 
between individuals are random1.  Given the assumption, the behavior of the population 
                                                
1 This assumption fits well with peer-to-peer music sharing networks where downloaders 
and sharers are anonymous and have no social interaction except for music downloading.  
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is contingent upon average payoffs of the two types of individuals. We denote sharers’ 
average payoff at time t as ( )
S
v t  and downloaders’ average payoff as ( )
F
v t .  Sharer’s 
average payoff is influenced by number of downloads requested from each sharer, which 
is in turn determined by the proportion of downloaders in the community. ( )
S
v t can 
therefore be considered as a function of downloader ratio ( )FSF xxx + .  Likewise, 
downloader’s average payoff is influenced by number of downloads they obtained from 
sharers, which is in turn determined by the proportion of sharers in the community.  
Therefore, we can express ( )
F
v t  as a function of sharer ratio ( )FSS xxx + .  The above 
discussion also indicates that a peer-to-peer network is uniquely determined by its 
population state ( ( ), ( ))
S F
x t x t .  Given the population state, sharers and downloaders 
realize their payoffs ( )
S
v t and ( )
F
v t , which determine the change of subpopulations in the 
next period.  This process creates a path of evolution.   
Population Dynamics 
Sharer and downloader subpopulations changes through gaining new users and 
losing existing users (also called birth rate and death rate in the evolutionary game 
theory). Based on replicator dynamics, user gain and user loss are determined by their 
payoffs.  When payoff increases, the community gains more new users and loses less 
existing users.  For tractability, evolutionary game theory typically assumes the rate of 
change is a linear function of the payoff.  For example, when ( )
S
x t sharers have ( )
S
v t  





S  equals 
to ( ) SSS btva + , where Sa represents the degree to which sharer population is influenced 
by the average payoff it receives and Sb  captures the inherent growth of in number of 
sharers.  We can further decompose the change in sharer population ( )tdxS  into gain of 
                                                                                                                                            
It however may not fit with other types of social networks where individuals may develop 
social ties that lead to repeated interaction with each other. 
  66
new sharers ( )tdx gS  and loss of existing sharers ( )tdx
l




SS −= .  
The decomposition provides more details of the dynamics how the sharer population in a 






























+=  (1b) 
Equations (1a) and (1b) indicate sharer subpopulation reaches its stable point 
when gain in new sharers ( ) gSS
g




S btva + .  Let 
*
Sv  be sharer payoff at the stable point.  When the network offers higher payoff to sharers, 
the peer-to-peer network obtains a net gain of sharers.  Otherwise, the network incurs a 
net loss of sharers.   






F as a linear function of average downloader payoff ( ) FFF btva + , 
where Fa represents the degree to which downloader subpopulation is influenced by the 
average payoff it receives and Fb  captures the inherent growth of number of 
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Differential equations in Equations (1) and (2) capture the complete dynamics for 
the evolution of the peer-to-peer networks.  The objective of this study is to empirically 
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validate the dynamics proposed by evolutionary game theory and to quantify the 
evolution process of peer-to-peer networks.  The empirical validation of the dynamics 
requires us to revise Equations (1) and (2) to discrete time periods.  We therefore have 
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
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Equation (3) describes the dynamics with regard to net changes in the two sub-
populations, while Equation (4) provides detailed dynamics on gain and loss of sharers 
and downloaders.   
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Evolutionary game theory provides an elegant explanation of the process by 
which economic agents in a community converge to equilibrium behavior without 
requiring such agents to have full information and perfect foresights about the market. A 
direct implication of the theory is that agents converge to equilibrium over time and the 
speed of the convergence is determined by the mechanism used by the agents. Based on 
the theoretical development discussed in the previous section, we empirically test the 
evolution of online sharing community using data collected from a music sharing 
community in the IRC Undernet (Mp3passion). 
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Data Description 
We use data from the Mp3passion channel – a music sharing community in the 
IRC Undernet – to test the implication of evolutionary game. From March 2001 to May 
2006, we monitored and recorded all user activities in the community. On average more 
than 56,000 files were downloaded per day in this community, equivalent to 0.05% of the 
global music sharing volume (Wall Street Journal, 19 November 2003). Our data provide 
detailed information on sharers and downloaders at different time periods. In addition, 
our data also capture changes in user types, sharing and downloading activities. The 
wealth of the dataset enables us to examine the evolution and dynamics of the 
community. 
Our log data of user activities are aggregated on the daily basis. Tables 3.1 and 
3.2 show the descriptions and the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in this 
paper.   The summary statistics suggest that on average 3539 downloaders using the peer-
to-peer network daily and 2399 among them are new comers in a given day.  Despite the 
significant number of newcomers, the downloader population is overall stable as about 
the same number of downloaders exit from the network daily.  We observe similar 
phenomenon for sharers with an average of 526 sharers use the peer-to-peer network 
daily, 203 of which are newcomers in a given day.  The overall sharer population is also 
stable with equal number of sharers joining and exiting the network daily.  Table 3.2 also 
shows that sharers account for about 13% of the total population with a standard 
deviation of 4%. 
 
 
Variable  Description 
Downloader(t) The number of users who only download music at day t  
DownloaderGain(t) The number of new downloaders observed at day t  
DownloaderLoss(t) The number of downloaders disappeared at day t 
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Sharer(t) The number of users who share music at day t  
SharerGain(t) The number of new sharers observed at day t  
Sharer Loss(t) The number of sharers disappeared at day t  
SharerRatio(t) Proportion of sharers in the population at day t 
Table 3.1. Variable Description 
 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Downloader(t) 1001 3539.64 3580 355.92 1386 5164 
DownloaderGain(t) 1001 2399.93 2410 266.90 835 3841 
DownloaderLoss(t) 1001 2402.47 2422 261.27 959 3866 
Sharer(t) 1001 526.30 548 174.10 154 1440 
SharerGain(t) 1001 203.79 197 110.94 41 1025 
Sharer Loss(t) 1001 203.87 195 112.44 35 1047 
SharerRatio(t) 1001 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.31 
Table 3.2. Summary Statistics of Daily Data 
Based on the download requests and associated user IDs in the raw data, we can 
build a downloader list and count the number of unique individuals who only download 
files in day t as Downloader(t). Downloader gain (loss) was calculated by comparing 
each day's list to the previous day's to determine the number of new downloaders (or 
downloaders disappeared). Similarly because each file server should announce its status 
regularly, we can compose a list of sharers and calculate Sharer(t), SharerGain(t), and 
SharerLoss(t). 
Empirical Model 
Using the IRC data, we calculate daily rates of net gain (loss), absolute gain and 
absolute loss of sharers and downloaders.  These daily change rates are dependent 
variables in equation (3) and (4).  The independent variable in equation (3) and (4) is 
average payoff to sharers and average payoff to downloaders.  As we mentioned earlier, 
evolutionary game theory assumes a large population and individuals in the network have 
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equal opportunity to meet each other in each time period (Ellison 1993).  Given the 
assumption, we can write the average sharer payoff as a linear function of the proportion 
of downloaders in the network ( )FSF xxx + .  Similarly, the average download payoff 
can be expressed as a linear function of the proportion of sharers in the network 
( )FSS xxx + .  Note that ( ) ( )FSSFSF xxxxxx +−=+ 1 , the payoffs to sharers and 
downloaders can be fully summarized by the sharers’ ratio.  Given that payoff functions 
are equivalent up to positive linear transformation, we have 
( )
( )








=  ; and (5) 
( )
( )







=  (6) 
Substituting equation (5) and (6) into Equations (3) and (4) and adding the 
necessary noise term, our estimation model is as follows: 
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Table 3.3 presents the estimation results.  Column (1) and (2) shows the dynamics 
of net changes in sharers and downloader population.   The corresponding equation forms 
are as follows.   
 
DownloaderChangeRate(t) = 0.17(SharerRatio(t-1) – 0.11) (9)  
 
SharerChangeRate(t) = -0.21(SharerRatio(t-1) – 0.15) (10) 
 
where DownloaderChangeRate = 








FF , SharerChangeRate= 








SS  and SharerRatio= 
( )








Equation (9) suggests that downloaders are resource seeking and the change of 
downloader subpopulation is self-regulated: when the sharer ratio is low and downloaders 
get less payoffs in the community, some of them start leaving and the increasing sharer 
ratio improves the payoff for the rest of downloaders.  Likewise, when the sharer ratio is 
high and downloaders get more payoffs, new downloaders join the community, leading to 
a decrease in sharer ratio.  The equation shows that downloader subpopulation reach a 
rest point when sharer ratio equals to 11%, in which case there will be no change in 
number of downloaders.   
On the other hand, as shown in equation (9), the change of sharer population is 
negatively correlated with the sharer ratio. This result is consistent with sharer altruism 
proposed by Torvalds (1998). Sharers are interested in contributing resources and their 
payoff increases with number of downloaders in the community.  More sharers will join 
if the sharer ratio is lower than 15%.  On the other hand, when there are more than 15% 
sharers in the peer-to-peer network, sharer subpopulation will decrease.  That is, sharers’ 
rest point is 15%.  
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Rate SharerLoss Rate 
SharerRatio(t-1) 0.16*** (0.06) -0.21*** (0.07) 0.11*    (0.06) -0.061*** (0.02) 0.92*** (0.07) 1.13*** (0.04)
Constant -0.019** (.004) 0.031*** (0.01) 0.67*** (0.008) 0.69*** (0.002) 0.26*** (0.01) 0.23*** (0.005)
Note: *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10 
Table 3.3. Direct Estimation Results 
However neither 11% nor 15% is an equilibrium point for the peer-to-peer 
network.  This is because downloaders and sharers interact with each other.  Solving 
Equations (9) and (10) together, we find the network reaches an equilibrium sharer ratio 
at 13% at which both downloader and sharer subpopulations grow steadily at the same 
speed.  Our results also show the existence of a growth region between 11% and 15% 
where the downloader population and the sharer population increase simultaneously.  
Figure 3.1 provides a graphic representation of the underlying dynamics of the peer-to-
peer networks.  The solid straight line requires the equilibrium sharer ratio at 13%.  The 
two dotted straight lines on the two sides represent the growth region bounded by sharer 
ratio at 11% and 15% respectively.  For network states lie within the growth region 
(Region III), the paths of population changes are featured by simultaneous increase in 
number of sharers and downloaders.  However, for network states lie outside of the 
growth region (Regions I and II), their paths of population changes are characterized by 
first a decrease in one of the subpopulations and then simultaneous increases in number 
of sharers and downloaders.  In either case, the population is stable because any sharer 
ratio will convert to the equilibrium ratio eventually. Our results explain the mechanism 
by which a peer-to-peer network grows and we show that the growth of the network is 
embedded in the complementary between downloaders and sharers.  Our results also 
reveal the mechanism by which peer-to-peer networks avoid unstable dynamics such as 
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avalanche and collapse.  We find that downloaders and sharers dynamics can self-recover 





































Figure 3.1. Sharer Ratios and the Paths of Population Changes 
We further consider the process through which the peer-to-peer network gains or 
losses its users.  Columns (3) – (6) in Table 3.3 estimate the dynamics for gain and loss of 
downloaders as well as gain and loss of sharers.  The equations for the dynamics are as 
follows 
 
DownloaderGainRate(t) = 0.11SharerRatio(t-1)) + 0.66 (11)  
DownloaderLossRate(t) = -0.06SharerRatio(t-1)) + 0.69 (12)  
SharerGainRate(t) = 0.92SharerRatio(t-1)) + 0.26 (13)  
SharerLossRate(t) = 1.13SharerRatio(t-1)) + 0.23 (14)  
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The results show that downloaders have an inherent gain rate of 66% and loss rate 
of 69%, while the inherent gain and loss rate of sharers are 26% and 23% respectively.  
This suggests the overall turnout rate for downloaders is much higher than for sharers.  
We also find that the overall impact of sharer ratio on change in downloader population is 
relatively small.  Each 10% increase in sharer ratio in the previous time period increases 
downloader gain by about 1% and decrease downloader loss by 0.6%.  On the other hand, 
sharer ratio has a much bigger impact on change in sharer population.   
EVOLUTIONARY GAME AND DISEQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
Evolutionary game theory suggests the convergence to equilibrium is a gradual 
process due to myopic users.  An alternative explanation of the dynamics is cost for 
changes.  For example, a downloader who has exited a peer-to-peer network is unlikely to 
be aware of recent increases in number of sharers on the network.  Such information 
disadvantage is a type of adjustment costs and reduces the speed of convergence to the 
equilibrium. Griliches (1967) and Maddala (1983) show that in a market with adjustment 
costs, agents may not fully adjust their strategies and the market equilibrium may reflect 
only a partial adjustment.  In this section, we apply disequilibrium models to the study of 
evolutionary in peer-to-peer networks and compare the similarity between evolutionary 
game model and the disequilibrium model.   
We again assume that the network state is determined by number of downloaders 
and number of sharers.  Downloaders can be considered as the daily demand in the peer-
to-peer network, while number of sharers can be considered as the daily supply in the 
network.  The equilibrium between the demand and supply can be specified as follows: 
( ) ( )













The interaction between the two equations determines the market equilibrium as 
defined in the traditional game theory literature. The assumption of disequilibrium model, 
however, indicates the equilibrium does not arise instantly. Due to adjustment costs, 
market equilibriums only reflect partial adjustments.  To capture the partial adjustment 
process, the disequilibrium approach suggests Equations (15) shall be revised as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )














1  (16) 
In the above model,  λ  represents the speed at which the market converges to the 
equilibrium. When λ  equals to 1, equations (16) become the same as equations (15), 
indicating that users in the network can instantly reach the equilibrium and rejecting the 
disequilibrium model. The smaller λ goes, the longer it takes for the market to reach the 
market equilibrium, providing supports for the presence of adjustment costs.  
We simultaneously estimate equations (16). The results (Table 3.4) show strong 
evidence that convergence to market equilibrium is not instant.  The estimation for the 
sharer equation indicates a coefficient of 0.93 on ( )1−txS , which corresponds to a λ1 
value of 0.07.  The small value of λ1 indicates a slow speed at which the market 
converges to the equilibrium.  In each period, the market makes a partial adjustment of 
only 7% for sharer dynamics.  The estimation for the downloader equation is slightly 
better.  The coefficient on ( )1−txS  is 0.70, representing a λ2 value of 0.30.   The results 
again suggest the market does not converge to equilibrium instantly.  Rather, the market 
makes a partial adjustment of about 30% in each time period for the downloader 
dynamics.  Overall, we find users in the peer-to-peer music sharing community take a 
long time to converge to market equilibrium and the convergence is mainly driven by the 
mobility of users who request files. They are more responsive to changes in availability 




Variable Parameter Estimate Variable Parameter Estimate 
Equation (16): Downloader equation  Equation (16): Sharer equation  
Downloader(t-1) 0.70*** (0.02) Sharer(t-1) 0.93*** (0.01) 
Sharer(t) -0.16*** (0.05) Downloader(t) -0.03*** (0.008) 
Note: *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10 
Table 3.4. Simultaneous Equation Estimation Results 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The blossom of online communities has intrigued both academic researchers and 
popular press. Understanding the dynamics and the sustainability of such communities 
has important implications in investigating their influences on e-commerce as well as 
contributing to the current online communities and online social network literature. In 
this paper, we take an evolutionary game approach to model online sharing communities 
from a dynamic perspective. More importantly, we take the first step to empirically test 
the evolution of the online sharing community using data collected from the IRC music 
sharing network. Our model predicts that the two major members (downloaders and 
sharers) in the community both play an essential role in the community. In contrast to the 
traditional view that downloaders only consume resources in the community, our model 
predicts that the existence of downloaders and their self-regulation effect influence the 
growth of sharers’ population. Thus, the tendency of avalanche and collapse is reduced. 
In other words, downloaders act as a resistance or stabilizer of a community. Our 
empirical results show strong support for the evolutionary process of the community. In 
addition, our results indicate that users in the music sharing community take a long time 
to converge to market equilibrium and the convergence is mainly driven by the mobility 
of users who request files (mostly downloaders).  
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The future extensions of this research lie in the following directions. First, the 
evolutionary game model will be extended to incorporate other dynamics in order to 
capture more complex structure of online communities. Second, the empirical test will be 
fully extended to examine the behavior, activities, conversion, and transformation of 
various members in the community from a dynamic perspective. Third, the empirical test 
will also be extended to different types of online communities in order to explore the 
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